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This thesis examines the relationship between the sound of a certain playable 
sound-sculpture, the bow chime, and the notion of the sublime. Noted by many critics for 
its power and profundity, the sound of this late 1960s invention perhaps epitomises the 
idea of a so-called “sublime experience”: it prompts an unnerving moment; a moment 
that unsettles and overwhelms its listeners; an experience in which words fail  and all 
points of comparison disappear. Drawing upon the ideas of philosophers such as Edmund 
Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-François Lyotard, this thesis attempts to sketch out a few 
of the processes through which such feelings of sublimity may arise in the encounter with 
this  sound.  The  discussion  is  specifcally  centred  around  three  of  the  author's 
experiences, each of which focuses on common characteristics of the bow chime's sound. 
Overall,  this  thesis  will  form  three  proposals  as  to  the  nature  of  the  bow  chime's 
sublimity, which concern, respectively, the terror of the sound's intense loudness, the 
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Oh that sound. It's the sound the Earth makes when it's happy, the sound 
of the world turning, the sound of Om, the mystic underscore of creation, 
the music of the spheres. Imagine the foghorn of the Queen Mary become 
angelic. Imagine the richest deep bell you've ever heard, with its vibrating 
stacks of overtones in perfect fourths and ffths and octaves from the 
main chime; then deepen it until in your imagination it sounds like the 
chime of the universe.
(Robb, 2005: 2).
The introduction.
In this quote, music critic Christina Robb attempts to convey the experience that 
she  felt  hearing  the sound generated by  a  playable  sound-sculpture  named the  bow 
chime. Perhaps by any standard, the words she chooses to use here are unusual. Her 
descriptions seem to slip out of – or perhaps even abandon – all conventional terms of 
musical and/or acoustic articulation, with her preference instead being, references to the 
conditions and determinations of nature ('the sound of the world turning'), the divine ('the 
foghorn of the Queen Mary become angelic'), and the mystical ('the music of the spheres'). 
In such a way, Robb seems to invite the reader to consider this  sound as  something 
exceptionally rare, unusual, and 'out of the ordinary'. As well, her words perhaps also 
indicate – to me at least – that she found this sound to be something of compelling, 
unnerving beauty. 
When I use the word 'beauty' here though, I use the term in no ordinary sense. I 
am referring to a beauty far from ordinary; a beauty that perhaps defes the very margins 
of 'the beautiful';  a beauty that, indeed, enters a space where the very term 'beautiful' 
begins to seem unsatisfactory. To me, Robb's statement suggests, if you like, a beauty 
beyond  the  beautiful;  it  suggests  something  greater  and  more  profound  than  the 
beautiful. It suggests something not simply pleasing – as we might normally associate 
with a thing of  beauty – but  awe-inspiring,  magnifcent,  and astounding.  Indeed, the 
closest  that  I  am able to come in  description to  such a  beauty  is  with  another term 
altogether: 'sublime'.
The sublime.
So what is the meaning of the word 'sublime'? What kind of a feeling does the 
term express? And what does a moment of so-called 'sublimity' entail? We may be well 
familiar with the word 'sublime' as the term is used in colloquial English: that is, as a 
1
vague superlative  used to  express  surprise  and admiration.  We may  be  less  familiar, 
though, with the term's usage in the more specifc realms of philosophy, literary studies, 
art history and cultural criticism; felds in which the word 'sublime' and the idea connoted 
by it has a varied range of more specifc applications and meanings. In such domains, the 
notion of 'the sublime' in fact represents a long-standing area of theoretical debate; an 
area  of  debate  that  extends  back  hundreds  of  years  to  an  aesthetic  treatise  usually 
attributed to an ancient Greek critic, Dionysius Longinus (See Longinus, 1965). So in these 
felds, what meaning does the word 'sublime' express?
Typically, the terms 'sublimity' and the 'sublime' are taken to refer to a 'rush' of 
intense aesthetic pleasure; a pleasure that is often taken to paradoxically stem from the 
displeasure associated with fear, horror or pain; and which is usually considered to be 
prompted  by  powerful  and  overwhelming  experiences.  In  contrast  to  other  aesthetic 
categories such as the beautiful, the sublime is thus dark, profound, and overwhelming; it 
represents a divisive force that encourages feelings of diference and deference (Shaw, 
2006: 9). The sublime, as such, describes encounters with such things as the rugged, the 
forceful, the wild, and the primitive. As well, it articulates the taste for such things as 
ruins, for the alpine, for storms, for deserts and oceans, for the supernatural, and for the 
shocking.
It is in this sense, then, that I use the word 'sublime' as an articulation of Robb's 
experience. Her words suggest – to me at least – that she felt the sound of the bow chime 
to be something beyond the merely beautiful; that she felt the sound to be something 
compelling, powerful and profound; that she felt the sound to be sublime. It is such an 
experience of sublimity, as prompted by the sound of the bow chime, that this thesis shall  
consider.
The aim.
It is the intention of this project to examine how the sound generated by the bow 
chime relates to the notion of the sublime; and to achieve this task, in this thesis I will 
sketch out a few of the processes through which sublimity may arise in the experience of 
the bow chime's sound. 
This  discussion,  specifcally,  shall  be  centred  around  three  experiential  case 
studies. Each case study has been drawn from my own particular experiences with this 
sound; and each directly concerns some signifcant aspect of it. Throughout the thesis, 
the distinctive traits detailed in each case study will be linked to the ideas of a select 
number of  philosophers  –  namely,  Edmund Burke,  Immanuel  Kant,  and  Jean-François 
Lyotard – who have each conducted theoretical enquiries into the nature of the sublime 
moment.  This  investigation  will  comprise  three  main  discussions;  each  discussion  of 
which will concern itself with one case study, with each focusing its attention upon one 
philosopher's ideas as to the nature of the sublime, as well as, an explanation detailing 
how those ideas relate to the bow chime and its sound.
Given that each one of these main discussions shall review in quite some depth 
the fner mechanics of a particular kind of sublimity and its sublime moment, I will abstain 
from providing beforehand anything other than a more overall introduction to the subject 
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of the sublime. Before proceeding with even this task though, it is frst necessary to ofer 
an introduction to the bow chime itself. In the following section, I will thus outline the 
history of the bow chime, noting a couple of points about its performance history, its 
social and (art-)historical context and other such matters. As well, I  shall  review what 
other commentators have previously written about it.
3
1
An Introduction to the
Bow Chime.
Sail-like  pieces  of  gleaming  metal  supported  by  frames  which  wrap 
themselves  around  steel  rods  produce  eerie,  diaphanous,  sensuous, 
hovering ambiences, [the] sounds of squadron bombers fying overhead, 
[and] of whales communicating undersea.
(Anon1, 2005).
Robert Rutman and the bow chime.
The bow chime – and its sister instrument, the steel  cello – arose following a 
collaboration between artists Robert  (Bob)  Rutman and Constance Demby in  Rutman's 
New York gallery in the late 1960s. Rutman was a painter and Demby a multimedia artist 
with  musical  training,  both of  whom were collaborating on a multimedia 'happening'1 
entitled Space Mass in 1967. 
“Following a chance encounter with a sheet of scrap metal on a piece of New York 
waste  ground [beforehand],  it  was  incorporated  into  [Space  Mass  as  a]  ...  projection 
screen and percussion instrument” (Palka, 2006: 3), its full range of sonic qualities only to 
be discovered later. As Rutman explains in a documentary surveying the history of both of 
his sound-sculptures: “They were accidental instruments … we attached [the scrap sheets 
of steel] to the foor and the ceiling and … welded [on] steel rods … We [initially] thought 
[hitting the rods] would sound good as a xylophone, but it didn't … so we started bowing 
them, and that's where the sound really came from” (Rutman, in Palka and Chapman, 
2005).  Similarly,  Demby  alludes  to  the  chance  discovery  of  the  resonances  of  steel, 
suggesting: “I was about to torch a big piece of sheet metal ... but the roar of the sheet 
made my torch stop in mid-air, and thus was borne the frst version of the Sonic Steel 
Instruments, a primitive thunder sheet” (Demby, 2006). 
Both artists thereafter “took time and the involvement of others to perfect the 
fnal product, which in Demby’s case took the fnal form … [of] the 'Whale Sail' and 'The 
Space Bass'  and in Rutman’s the 'Steel Cello'  and [the subject of this study, the] 'bow 
1As developed by artist Allan Kaprow, a 'happening' could be defined as “a non-verbal, theatrical production 
that abandons stage-audience structure as well as the usual plot or narrative line of traditional theatre. 
Although a compartmented organization may be used, the performers are considered as objects – often 
kinaesthetically involved – with an overall design of environment, timing, sound, colour and light. Found 
objects are often used and built upon, but the events are not causally arrived at, nor are they entirely 
accidental and spontaneous” (Kaprow, 1966).
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chime'” (Palka, 2006: 4). Rutman's steel cello could be described as a 3x8 ft. sheet of 
stainless steel suspended from a stand to form a vertical curve. It supports a single string 
that when bowed produces a range of resonances (see fgure i. below). The bow chime, 
alternatively, features a similar stainless sheet suspended horizontally on a “T” shaped 
frame. The horizontal bar of this frame also supports a number of steel rods, which are 
similarly bowed to produce usually low resonances and drones (see fgure ii. below).  
            Figure i. The steel cello (Rutman, 1979).                    Figure ii. The Bow Chime (Rutman, 1979).
For both Rutman and Demby, the “chance discovery of the sonic qualities of scrap 
steel in the late 1960s marked the inception of their careers with sound sculpture which 
continue to this day” (Palka, 2006: 4). Initially incorporated into multimedia 'happenings', 
Rutman and  his sound-sculptures  “have  had  a  rich career  spanning a  wide  range  of 
artistic  genres,  collaborations  and  sites”  (ibid).  These  have  included  high-profle 
collaborations  with internationally  acclaimed artists  such as  Merce Cunningham, Peter 
Sellars, Heiner Goebbels, and Einsturzende Neubauten.2 Also, his sound-sculptures have 
been used in performances of great classics by “Shakespeare, Euripides, Rilke, Coleridge; 
in established institutions ranging from MOMA in New York, the ICA London, the Palace of 
Culture in Warsaw, as well as in site-specifc and experimental environments such as the 
Tiergarten road tunnel in Berlin and with experimental instruments such as theramins and 
pyrophones” (ibid: 2).
More recently, Rutman's lineage has also spawned a number of second and even 
third generation practitioners – each of which has further developed Rutman's creations 
and the way they are utilised in performance. This point is illustrated in a recent DVD 
2For more information on these works, see: 'Merce Cunningham Dance Company with Robert Rutman' 
(Anon3, 2005); 'King Lear (Dir. Peter Sellars)' (Anon4, 2005); Heiner Goebbels: Walden (Goebbels, 1998); 
and 'Einsturzende Neubauten: Where the Metal Really is Metal' (Parales, 2005). 
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documentary surveying the performance history of Rutman's sound-sculptures that,  in 
addition to Rutman,  interviews two second-generation practitioners,  Adrian Palka  and 
Wolfram Spyra, who both describe areas of performance far removed from Rutman's (see 
Palka and Chapman, 2005). 
The growing interest in both the bow chime and steel cello is perhaps signifcant 
as it indicates that Rutman's creations can now “be legitimately accepted as new musical 
instruments with the potential for a dedicated repertoire” (Palka, 2006: 3). This is a point 
perhaps also signalled by the emergence of a number of, what we might call, 'repertoire' 
pieces:  Rutman's  Song of the Steel  Cello, and  Dresden; Palka and Spyra's  Dislocation; 
Goebbels'  Walden.3 As well, this point is highlighted further still by the inclusion of the 
steel  cello  and  bow  chime  both  in  Bart  Hopkin's  book,  Musical  Instrument  Design: 
Practical Information for Instrument Making (1996), as well as in a small number of more 
academically-minded texts. I will review the main texts of interest below. 
Figure iii. Rutman performing on the steel cello in the late 1970s 
(Rutman, 1979).
Literature Review.
Though Rutman,  over  the  years,  has  received  many  a  mention  in  journalistic 
reviews and the like (see Johnson, 2005; O'Connor, 2005; Robb, 2005), and has even been 
the  subject  of  a  short  documentary  flm (Palka  and  Chapman,  2005),  the  amount  of 
academic  literature  concerning  the  bow  chime  remains  modest.  In  fact,  excluding 
journalistic reviews and other such publications, the academic interest in the bow chime 
amounts simply to the work of two fgures: David Chapman (2003), and Adrian Palka 
3Rutman's Song of the Steel Cello  can be heard on his album, 1939 (1998). The other pieces noted here, at 
the time of writing, remain unpublished in a recorded format. 
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(2006). 
In the remainder of this section, I shall ofer a brief overview of Chapman's and 
Palka's work, with the intention of addressing a number of questions concerning my own: 
How do the views and intentions of the existing literary contributions concerning the bow 
chime compare with those of my own in this work? Has anyone else viewed the bow chime 
in terms of the sublime? Is there even a suggestion of the sublime or related idea in any of 
the existent literature? Furthermore,  does my approach to the bow chime represent a 
logical extension to the previous writing on the subject?
I shall begin this review surveying the work of Chapman, which takes the form of 
a  short  paper  entitled  From Object  to  Instrument;  the  ambiguity  of  sound-sculpture 
(2003).4
 Chapman's  initial  concern  in  this  paper  lies  with  issues  of  categorisation. 
Specifcally, how we might categorise 'sound-sculpture' as an artistic endeavour. At the 
opening of the paper, Chapman uses a case study of the steel cello and bow chime to 
suggest  the notion  of  sound-sculpture as  a hybrid  form that  traverses the realms of 
traditional categorisation. “The element of sound”, Chapman remarks, “brings to sculpture 
a time-based dimension and a relationship with acoustic space, which is denied to the 
traditional sculptural  object” (Chapman, 2003: 2). Because of this,  the bow chime and 
steel cello, and indeed, any other objects that have been labelled as 'sound-sculptures', 
are intrinsically interdisciplinary and “in their performance history [provoke] a complex set 
of interactions which have traversed visual art, architecture, music, dance, and theatre” 
(ibid). It is precisely this performance history that Chapman spends the majority of his 
paper discussing.
Having proposed sound-sculpture as a hybrid, interdisciplinary form, Chapman 
thereafter surveys a brief fragment of the history of playable sound-sculptures prior to 
the bow chime and steel cello. Chapman's intention here, as he puts it, is to place both 
the steel cello and bow chime “within a wider [sphere of] development and [as such] … 
outline some particular tendencies” (Chapman, 2003: 2). He mentions here, specifcally, 
the works of a number of fgures: Luigi Russolo, Harry Partch, and the Baschet Brothers. 
For the purpose of this overview, a brief summary of each shall sufce.
Chapman  begins  by  mentioning  the  work  of  Italian  Futurist,  Luigi  Russolo. 
Through both  his  1913  manifesto,  The  Art  of  Noises (see  2004),  and  his  battery  of 
original  instruments,  the  intonarumori5,  Russolo  directly  raised  questions  of  what 
constituted musical sound, and directly demanded the regeneration of music “through 
challenging the demarcation of what sound/noises were acceptable within the sphere of 
musical  practice”  (Chapman,  2003:  3).  Essentially,  Chapman notes,  Russolo  aimed to 
“widen the gene-pool of organised sound by bringing the sounds, or more precisely the 
4Chapman's paper, From Object to Instrument, was originally a conference paper delivered at 
“WARP/WOOf”, Leeds University, 2003. 
5Russolo's Intonarumori, premièred on 2nd June, 1913 in Modena, Italy, were conceived as a “Noise 
orchestra” comprising six categories: 1. roars/claps/noises of falling water/driving noises/bellows; 2. 
whistles/snores/ snorts; 3. whispers/mutterings/rustlings/grumbles/ grunts/gurgles; 4. shrill sounds/cracks/ 
buzzings/ jingles/shuffles; 5. percussive noises using metal/wood/skin/stone/baked earth etc.; 6. animal and 
human voices/shouts/moans/screams/laughter/rattlings/sobs. For more information on Russolo and his 
Intonarumori, see his manifesto, The Art of Noises (2004).
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'noise', of the outside world of modernity, into the realms of art and music” (ibid). The 
intonarumori were a direct means of achieving this aim through their invocation of the 
noise  of  the  modern  –  and  they  could  well  be  considered  to  mark  the  birth  of  the 
movement of artists conceiving and creating sound-sculptures.
Chapman's second fgure of interest is Harry Partch, who “notoriously burnt his 
own [more traditionally styled] compositions in 1930, and set himself on a course towards 
the creation of a new set of instruments” (Chapman, 2003: 3-4). These new instruments, 
Chapman notes, announced Partch's break “both from his own musical past and more 
generally that of western art music - in particular what he regarded as the ‘tyranny’ of the 
system of  12-tone,  equal  temperament”  (ibid).  Whereas,  then,  Russolo's  intonarumori 
demonstrate a break from the forms and codes of  western art  music in the name of 
modernity,  Partch's  break  was  “conceived  in  the  terms  of  a  reconnection  with  older 
practices and civilisations” (ibid). In such a way, for Chapman, Partch's sound-sculptures 
demonstrate “a drive couched in a nostalgia for an imagined past which ... [Partch] sees as 
a repository for values lacking in his own time and culture” (ibid: 4).6
Chapman's  third  and  fnal  point  of  focus  is  Les  Sculptures  Sonores:  the 
instruments  conceived  and  created  by  François  and  Bernard  Baschet  (the  Baschet 
Brothers).  Les  Sculptures Sonores present  again an altogether  diferent  scenario  from 
either Russolo or Partch. Created in the late 1940s, the Baschets contended that the sonic 
experience  of  their  instruments  could  rival  the  sonorities  produced  by  the  musique 
concrète  experimentations of Pierre Schaefer.7 However, unlike Partch and Russolo, the 
Baschets struggled to transcend received musical conventions, often opting for renditions 
of  Bach  and  Vivaldi  in  performances  (Baschet,  1990:  98).  As  Chapman  observes: 
“uncertain [of] how they traversed the various disciplines they could be aligned to ... [they] 
moved into the area of activity  which seemed the most straight-forward,  i.e.  a  direct 
engagement with the public through site specifc artworks and educational workshops” 
(Chapman, 2003: 6).  Les Sculptures Sonores were, in such a way, conceived equally as 
“gallery and site-specifc exhibits … as concert instruments, as educational aids and as 
marketable commodity” (ibid: 5).8
Chapman closes his paper with some overall observations on these fgures' works. 
Specifcally, suggesting that the conception and creation of sound-sculpture illustrates a 
utopian or visionary impulse; a utopianism that for whatever reason seeks to “break free 
of categorisation and constraint within discrete disciplines” (Chapman, 2003: 7). He also 
observes, though, that whilst the position of sound-sculpture in relation to established 
western musical culture “is complex, being both a disavowal of codes and conventions 
and a desire for its renewal … [between Russolo, Partch, and the Baschets at least] there is 
perhaps in common a re-evaluation of, or re-connection with, the fundamental materiality 
of sound beyond the codes and practices of music” (ibid). 
6For more information on Partch, see his book, Genesis of Music (1979).
7Musique concrète, a form of electronic music developed in the late 1940s by Pierre Schaeffer, was 
characterised by a utilisation of 'acousmatic sound' (that is, sound that one hears without seeing an originating 
cause), and was facilitated by the emergence of music technology such as microphones and magnetic tape 
recorders. For more information on Musique concrète, Pierre Schaeffer, or any of his associates, see any of 
Schaeffer's many writings (for example, 1967).
8 For more information on the Baschet brothers and Les Sculptures Sonores, see François Baschet's book, Les 
Sculptures Sonores (1990).
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To return to my own questions underpinning this review though, having sketched 
out Chapman's work, what may seem striking is the absence of discussion on the bow 
chime and steel cello specifcally.  Whilst indeed, Chapman at the opening of his work 
claims the bow chime and steel cello as a case study – and suggests that, as sound-
sculptures,  they  transcend  traditional  realms  of  categorisation  –  the  overwhelming 
majority of his words are spent tracing and establishing a wider art-historical lineage to 
which the bow chime and steel cello can be aligned. Whilst Chapman's paper, then, may 
well provide ample contextual grounding and background information for my discussion 
here, his art-historical motivations largely restrict him from devoting any thought at all to 
the  area  of  central  importance  to  this  project:  the  sound  the  bow  chime  generates. 
Indeed, he neglects even to provide a description of its sound – and certainly there is no 
mention of the sublime or any other related idea.
So this brings me on to the second fgure of interest in the bow chime's literature: 
Adrian Palka, whose remarks on the bow chime are to be found in a short paper entitled 
From Trash to Totem: An Odyssey of Steel (2006).9
The central  concern of this  paper lies with the notion of trash – that is,  with 
discarded matter and refuse. Specifcally, Palka's concern is with the artistic appropriation, 
use, or perhaps re-use of trash; an artistic strategy that could well be exemplifed by 
Rutman and Demby, whose sound-sculptures, we might recall, arose “following a chance 
encounter with a sheet of scrap metal on a piece of New York waste ground” (Palka, 2006: 
3). Palka begins his discussion, though, speaking more broadly about the use of trash in 
the arts. Only later on does he address the bow chime and steel cello specifcally. 
Palka explains at the work's opening that the artistic use of trash/rubbish has its 
roots  in  the  avant-garde  of  the  early  twentieth  century.  “The  employment  of  chance 
events and found and discarded objects”, Palka explains, “has its origins in the work of 
the  DaDaists”  (Palka,  2006:  4).  Particularly  of  relevance  here,  Palka  notes,  are  Kurt 
Schwitters and Marcel Duchamp, who both utilised found materials in their art work – in 
Schwitters' case, most notably in his Merzbau project10, and in Duchamp's, in his various 
'ready-made'  works11.  The drive  informing the  artistic  appropriation of  trash in  these 
works, Palka explains, represents a means “to redefne and re-ascribe symbolic value” 
(Palka,  2006:  7).  “Normative  socially  and  economically  derived defnitions  of  trash or 
rubbish  or  waste”,  Palka  suggests,  “emphasize  its  status  as  useless  and  unwanted. 
However,  to the  artist-maker  trash presents  dimensions beyond these.  To the artist-
maker, a piece of trash is primarily an object within a process of making and meaning-
making.  Trash  presents  objects,  which  while  still  visible,  though  not  used  to  fulfl 
9Palka's paper, From Trash to Totem, was originally a conference paper delivered at “Rubbish, Waste, and 
Litter; Culture and its Refuse/als”, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, 2006. 
10Schwitters' Merzbau was conceived as a vast architectural/sculptural project in which Schwitters both 
drastically altered the interiors of a number of spaces with various three-dimensional shape, and crowded the 
space with many other materials of objects – or “spoils” and “relics” – contained in countless nooks and 
grottoes. For more information on Schwitters' Merzbau, see Elizabeth Gamard's book, Kurt Schwitters'  
Merzbau: The Cathedral of Erotic Misery (2000).
11Duchamp coined the term 'ready-made' to describe various works of 'found art'. A notable example is 
Duchamp's work, Fountain (1917): an inverted urinal that Duchamp signed with the pseudonym “R. Mutt”. 
For more information on Duchamp, see any of the numerous commentaries on his work. For example, Janis 
Mink's book, Duchamp (2000).
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prescribed  social  and  economic  functions,  are  still  potentially  available,  useable  and 
wanted by the artist” (ibid). Thus, whilst trash may well represent material at the threshold 
of disappearance, by way of its appropriation, artists such as Schwitters and Duchamp, 
according to Palka, “inject [into trash] new uses, desires, meanings and defnitions” (ibid). 
I have already mentioned that the bow chime and steel cello – as well as Demby's 
derivatives – arose following the adoption of a similar artistic strategy: that is, “following a 
chance encounter with a sheet of scrap metal  on a piece of New York waste ground” 
(Palka, 2006: 3). In the early avant-garde works of Schwitters and Duchamp though, the 
possibilities and suggestions highlighted above – that being, to inject into trash new uses, 
meanings, and the like – were “issued in the form of direct and programmatic challenges 
to what artists perceived to be the fawed value systems of tradition and as a means to 
provok[e] ... wider transformations in consciousness and in society” (ibid: 8). By contrast, 
in  the  late  1960s  –  the  time  when  Rutman  and  Demby  were  active  –  the  aesthetic 
exploitation of the discarded object in such a way was a well established artistic strategy. 
In fact, it could be said that “from Kurt Schwitters' frst reassembled scraps of trash in 
his  ...  Merzbau in  the  early  twentieth century  ...  waste materials  have  maintained  an 
almost unbroken presence in art” (ibid: 6). For Palka though, the continuing relevance of 
the steel  cello  and bow chime still  lies  in  the  values of  transgression  and originality 
expressed in the early avant-garde. 
To explain why this is the case, Palka here turns to Hal Foster's text, The Return 
of the Real (1995), or more precisely, to Foster's notion of the 'return'. This is a notion we 
might understand less in terms of an actual return, and more in terms of a 'narrative of 
return' or reprise. Reviewing Foster's text, Palka suggests that “the art of the post-war 
avant-gardes in the US, which could be said to include Demby and Rutman ... does not 
represent a simple copy or inauthentic repetition of earlier work … [but rather] a reprise 
or 'return' to the [early] avant-garde in the form of a rigorous reworking of foundational 
avant-garde practices which act to advance art” (Palka, 2006: 6-7). In this light, Palka 
observes that whilst Rutman and Demby's methods may have been directly derived from 
the  early  avant-garde,  their  approaches  difered.  Whilst  the  programmatic  ideological 
position of the early avant-garde saw artists such as Schwitters and Duchamp present 
themselves “as masters of their materials, shaping them to ft their manifesto” (ibid: 10), 
Rutman and Demby's artistic practice was alternatively based on innocent positivism and 
empirical personal discovery. As Palka suggests: “Apparently unaware of the traditions 
they  followed,  their  statements  testify  to  slow  personal,  sometimes  collaborative, 
rediscoveries of pre-existent approaches and forms” (Palka, 2006: 11).
To this end also – and again invoking Foster's notion of the 'return' or reprise – 
Palka suggests as well that, “through the discovery of the sounds inherent in objects and 
found materials ... [Rutman and Demby's] work suggests a 'return' to the putative origins 
of music-making: A 'return' to the very roots of music” (Palka, 2006: 11). This is a point, 
for Palka, that is illustrated by commentaries on the sound-sculptures that “repeatedly 
refer to the sense of the 'ancient' and 'inborn' qualities of the sounds of the Steel Cello 
[and bow chime]” (ibid). Though, as Foster conceived it, this 'return' or reprise constitutes 
a  radical  reworking  of  earlier  practices  sufcient  to  advance contemporary  artistic 
practice.  So,  as  Palka  continues:  “Simultaneously  ...  the  use  of  industrial  materials 
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suggests a highly contemporary frame of reference. Audiences and critics searching for 
ways to describe what they hear in the sounds of the Steel Cello [and bow chime] refer 
equally to natural sounds and industrial sounds …These comments describe the process 
of 'return' as Foster defnes it,  to a form of artistic practice which is both primal and 
current” (ibid).
In closing the paper, Palka lastly discusses the trend of artists exploiting trash to 
“speak of objects and materials possessing soul and in terms of their redemption” (Palka, 
2006:  13).  This  trend  evokes  for  Palka  a  powerful  animistic  suggestion,  and  a  deep 
psychic interpenetration of  the artist  and his materials.  In concluding,  Palka  observes 
comparable artistic concerns in the process of making and performing enacted by Rutman 
and Demby. Through performance, Palka suggests, Rutman and Demby are able to “enter 
into a public display of attuned empathy with the objects they had produced. Through this 
process … [they are] able to enact, suggest and invoke a return to a primordial psychic 
link between man and object” (ibid: 13-14).
Having now sketched out the main points of Palka's paper, it might certainly be 
noted that in contrast to Chapman's work – which mentioned very little about the bow 
chime  itself  –  Palka's  ofers  some  valuable  insights  into  the  artistic  workings  and 
strategies  underlying the conception of  the bow chime. However,  the slant  of  Palka's 
enquiry still remains art-historical: by means of investigating Rutman's use of trash, Palka 
traces a lineage to the early avant-garde, and also, attempts to defne Rutman's work in 
terms of particular tendencies current to the time of the bow chime's conception such as 
the  'return'.  Perhaps  inevitably  then,  like  Chapman,  who  ceased  to  mention  anything 
about the bow chime other than its position in an art-historical lineage, Palka similarly 
stops short of devoting any real discussion to the sound the bow chime generates – and 
certainly, he does not speak of the bow chime in the specifc terms of the sublime.
Having reviewed Chapman's and Palka's paper then, we could well conclude that 
an  investigation  into  the  bow chime's  sublimity  represents  uncharted  terrain  when it 
comes to the academic literature surrounding Rutman's sound-sculpture.  Considering, 
though, that neither Chapman or Palka ofer even a mention of the term 'sublime', or 
'sublimity', or any related idea, we might frst ask the question: how might the subject of 
the sublime be justifed as a relevant area of investigation?
Given  the  paucity  of  academic literature on the subject,  here  we are  perhaps 
forced to turn to a variety of other texts; texts which in their remarks more readily make 
the tentative connection – even if indirectly – between the bow chime's sound and the 
notion of the sublime. The citation opening the thesis by Christina Robb (2005) I have 
already  noted  to  carry  some  suggestion  of  sublimity,  so  perhaps  needs  no  further 
mention  here.  Robb's  article,  though,  features  alongside  a  series  of  other  articles, 
commentaries,  pamphlets,  fyers  and so  forth,  which together have been collected as 
documentation to Chapman and Palka's DVD documentary on the performance history of 
the bow chime and steel cello (see Chapman and Palka, 2005). A number of these other 
commentaries are perhaps also signifcant in their evocation of powerful, profound, or 
overwhelming experiences –  qualities  that,  as  I  mentioned briefy  in  the introduction, 
represent perhaps the basic traits of a 'sublime experience'. 
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To name a few examples, in a collection of quotations assembled into a document 
simply entitled The Boston Globe Cuttings, (Anon1, 2005), an unknown author describes a 
performance of the bow chime, declaring: “The crowd is suspended on waves of sound, 
fascinated. Minds zoom out of their usual cramped quarters in the here and now … the 
strange sounds somehow makes the difcult connection of present and past to future. 
The late afternoon breeze blows, and time stops … Unearthly! It summons outer-space 
images and cosmic musings” (ibid). Another article, entitled  Steel Yourself by journalist 
Rory O'Connor (2005), likens Rutman's music to the act of breathing. Another article still, 
this time entitled  Synopsis of the US Steel Cello Ensemble (Anon2, 2005), suggests of 
Rutman's  sound-sculptures:  “if  you  release  your  critical  faculty  for  the  least  bit,  the 
pulsing [steel]  cello  can send you spinning down narrow corridors of  your  mind into 
places you've never been before” (ibid).
Given these remarks and their various evocations of astounding and profound 
experiences,  there  are  perhaps  some  grounds  to  argue  that  the  sound  of  Rutman's 
creations prompted for each fgure a 'sublime experience' – or something at least very 
similar. Assuming this to be the case, we could well justify an in-depth investigation into 
the bow chime's sound and its relation to the notion of sublimity, with the premise being: 
a number of people fnd this sound sublime, so now it seems logical to investigate the 
mechanisms that give rise to its sublimity.
Summary.
To summarise, having reviewed the academic texts of Chapman and Palka, we 
might certainly suggest there to be the potential for quite a substantial body of further 
research to be conducted into the bow chime, the steel cello, and other related areas. At 
present,  in  fact,  academic  enquiry  seems  to  be  limited  solely  to  art-historical  and 
contextual investigation. 
In this thesis, I shall attempt to break free from this particular trend and instead, 
open a dialogue of theoretical discussion concerning the aesthetic of the bow chime's 
sound. My intention, as I mentioned in the introduction, is to investigate how the sound 
generated by the bow chime relates to the notion of the sublime – a particular piece of 
terminology untouched in  Chapman's  and Palka's  papers on the  bow chime and steel 
cello. Before I open the main body of discussion though, it is frst necessary to provide a 
brief introduction to the theoretical debate on the sublime itself. 
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2
The Ghost of Longinus:
an introduction to the sublime.
What is the sublime?
As I mentioned at the opening of the work, the discourse of the sublime arose 
originally from an aesthetic treatise usually attributed to the ancient Greek critic Dionysius 
Longinus entitled  Peri Hupos,  or  On Sublimity (see Longinus, 1965). Longinus originally 
conceived  the  sublime  as  a  rhetorical  device;  as  “something  that  animates  poetic 
discourse from within … [and that leads] the listener or the reader into transports of 
ecstasy”  (Shaw,  2006:  2).  The  notion of  the  sublime,  though,  has  since  undergone a 
number of quite radical transformations at the hands of a large number of later fgures 
(for just a few examples, see Burnet, 1965; Ballie, 1953; Addison, 1826; Burke, 2007; 
Kant, 1951). Obviously, this thesis lacks the scope to include a concise examination of 
each and every adaptation of the term.12 Also, as I mentioned before, as each individual 
shall review in quite some depth the fner mechanics of a particular kind of sublimity and 
its  sublime  moment,  here  I  shall  simply  provide  a  more  general  introduction  to  the 
subject, detailing some of its general ideas and themes. 
Overall then, how might we defne the notion of the sublime? In broad terms, it 
might  be  said  that,  “whenever  experience  slips  out  of  conventional  understanding, 
whenever the power of an object or event is such that words fail and points of comparison 
disappear, then we resort to the feeling of the sublime” (Shaw, 2006: 2). Broadly defned 
then, the sublime marks “the limits of reason and expression together with a sense of 
what might lie beyond these limits” (ibid). The sublime refers, that is, to the “moment 
when the ability to apprehend, to know, and to express a thought or sensation is defeated 
… yet through this very defeat, the mind gets a feeling for that which lies beyond thought 
and language” (ibid: 3).
This particular characterisation of the sublime moment as a certain 'defeat' of the 
mind – a characterisation that is carried, in one way or another, through pretty much 
every major theoretical study into the term – leads many fgures to suggest the sublime 
12For an introduction to the overall history of the sublime, see Philip Shaw's book, The Sublime (2006). Or, 
for a more specific discussion on the early development of the term, see Marjorie Hope-Nicolson's book, 
Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (1959). 
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feeling itself to involve a sense of displeasure (for examples, see Burke, 2007; Kant 1951). 
Some fgures, in fact, even go as far as to suggest it to involve a feeling or terror and 
horror – a point to which I shall return later on. Many fgures consider the feeling of the 
sublime,  though, to also involve a  feeling of  pleasure.  In  fact,  most  consistently,  the 
sublime moment is considered to involve something of a contradictory feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure,  or  a  negative  pleasure  (for  examples,  again  see Burke,  2007;  Kant, 
1951). 
In each of the following sections, I will sketch out further the mechanisms of this 
kind of feeling. It might be noted here though that such a feeling is perhaps the most 
telling distinction of the sublime from other aesthetic categories such as the beautiful – 
which are often characterised as involving simply a sense of (disinterested) pleasure (Eco, 
2006: 294). In fact, in many studies the sublime is set against the concept of the beautiful 
– and more often than not, as a point of theoretical contrast (for examples, see Burke, 
2007;  Kant,  1951).  The  beautiful,  normally,  is  suggested  to  be  “light,  feeting  and 
charming … [encouraging] a spirit of unity and harmony” (Shaw, 2006: 9). The sublime, by 
contrast,  is  normally  considered  as  dark,  profound  and  overwhelming,  encouraging 
feelings of diference and deference. The sublime, thus, is greater than the beautiful – or 
at least by the power of its afects. The sublime is considered to be that which uplifts the 
soul and arouses great thoughts and passions; a term that represents the awe-inspiring, 
the magnifcent, the monumental, and the astounding.
However, like the beautiful,  and indeed,  like any other  aesthetic  category, the 
sublime is inherently a subjective feeling; a feeling, that is, whose stimuli can vary from 
one person to  another.  Both “the  objects  that  arouse  this  [sublime]  feeling  and their 
interpretations are [thus]  socially  constructed … and [so can] vary  not  only  from one 
epoch to another and from one culture to another but also from one discipline to another” 
(Nye, 1996: 3). As a consequence, perhaps inevitably, the subject of sublimity has been 
approached from a multitude of theoretical angles; each of which has addressed the topic 
from  a  diferent  perspective,  and  each  of  which  has  found  diferent  stimuli  for  its 
experience. 
A more traditional stance, for example, is to associate sublimity with such things 
as the alpine, storms,  deserts,  and oceans;  with the vast  and overwhelming forces of 
nature, which in particular instances are suggested to refect the glory of Deity (see, for 
examples, Burnet, 1965; Ballie, 1953; and Addison, 1826). This alone contrasts strongly 
with  the  original,  'rhetorical'  sublime conceived  by  Longinus  in  the  frst  century  A.D. 
(Hope-Nicolson,  1959:  321).  However,  more  recently,  the  subject  has  also  received 
something of a revival in discussions relating to a number of completely diferent areas: 
for  example,  from  those  seeking  to  describe  the  experience  of  certain  works  of  – 
particularly avant-garde – art, cinema and the like (see Lyotard, 1991; Žižek, 2000). On a 
related note also, analysis of the sublime has recently spilled over into various other areas 
of theoretical discussion. A number of writers in the psychoanalytic tradition, for example, 
have sought to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying its experience (see 
Wieskel, 1976; Lacan, 1992). It has also been debated by feminist critics (see Freeman, 
1995). It has even been employed in discussing the postmodern condition (see Lyotard, 
1992; Jameson, 1991). So how do I intend to approach and employ the term in this work?
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Sublimity and the bow chime.
In the following discussion, I  will  draw upon a number of,  perhaps, the more 
notable ideas concerning the nature of the sublime; each of which will in some way be 
linked to the experience of the bow chime and its sound. I mentioned in the introduction 
that this investigation shall comprise three discussions; each of which will focus upon one 
experiential case study of the bow chime's sound, and each of which will emphasise one 
philosopher's ideas about the sublime. Perhaps already we might see emerging some of 
the central  themes of this discussion:  a stress upon a certain 'defeat'  of  the mind by 
overwhelming  qualities  of  sound;  ideas  of  terror,  of  contradictory  pleasure  and 
displeasure, and so on. Before I proceed, however, a few words should frst be said about 
the content of the case studies. 
From the outset, I should stress that I do not intend to directly engage with any of 
the journalist-style commentaries on the bow chime already cited in the work – such as, 
for example, Christina Robb's statement cited at the opening of the work. These are, I 
feel,  simply  too  brief  and  defnitely  too  vague  to  provide  the  basis  of  a  full-scale 
investigation into the sound's sublimity.  Certainly,  they are not  substantial  enough to 
form case studies. Hence why I am opting to instead focus my attention solely upon a 
selection of my personal experiences. I mentioned this point already at the opening of the 
work: that I intend to centre the work around three case studies which each describe one 
of my own experiences with the bow chime and its sound. 
 It  perhaps  goes  without  saying  that,  in  selecting  these  case  studies,  I  have 
attempted to draw upon those experiences that seem to me to be most obviously ft for a 
discussion on sublimity; experiences that I feel could each be demonstrated to concern 
the  sublime  and  indeed,  for  me,  very  much prompted  such a  feeling  in  one  way  or 
another. To this end, these case studies are intended to serve a heuristic function: they 
form a broadly accurate guide to the sound and its sublime moments; a guide based upon 
general  knowledge  gained  by  my  own  experiences  and  encounters  with  it.  I  should 
perhaps stress at this stage though that the characteristics outlined in these case studies 
are not necessarily intended to be strictly accurate or reliable for every situation. I am not 
suggesting, that is, that each and every time this sound gives rise to sublimity, it will be 
prompted by one of these particular  characteristics.  Rather,  my intention is  for  these 
accounts to function as, simply, a 'rule of thumb'; an intuitive judgement or educated 
guess as to the characteristics of this sound in moments of sublimity. The same might be 
said also about each of the subsequent claims concerning the supposed nature of this 
sound's sublimity: they represent broad principles that are not intended to be strictly 
accurate or reliable in every encounter with the sound, but nevertheless, do provide a 
good educated guess as to its nature, based upon my own experiences with this sound.
The following section begins the main body of discussion. I will open this section 
– and each of the subsequent sections – with an overview of the experiential case study in 
question. I shall thereafter attempt to relate this experience to a particular idea about the 
nature of the sublime – in the frst instance based around the writings of Edmund Burke. 
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3
Teetering on the Edge 
of Annihilation:
an ecstasy of terror.
Case Study 1: Drowning in an ocean of sound.
In 2007, I attended a show by Rutman and a number of other bow chime (and 
steel cello) practitioners entitled Dislocation, which was performed in Coventry Cathedral. 
Constructed  in  the  1960s  following  the  destruction  of  the  former  Cathedral  in  the 
Coventry Blitz of World War Two, Coventry Cathedral – a gigantic box-like enclosed space 
–  has  a  most  interesting  acoustic.  Most  days  of  the  week,  the  general  public  are 
encouraged to wander around the space, to explore the alcoves and contemplate religion 
and life in general. At this time, one can hear the soft reverberant echoes of its visitors 
ever  so quietly  inhabiting  the space.  One can hear  everybody  at  once.  We might  say 
perhaps  that,  acoustically,  it  is  a  communal  space  –  it  certainly  is  not  dictatorial.  If 
desired, one can exercise selective listening, one can home in upon each instance and 
eavesdrop into conversations. One can internally localise and discriminate between many 
sound sources. One can sift through the soundscape, discard noise, and focus attention 
upon whatever or whomever one desires.
Delivered  in  this  space,  the  Dislocation  show  was  a  somewhat  formal  afair: 
audience members dressed in appropriately smart attire,  were served refreshments of 
wine and juice upon entry, and were seated on the pews of the Cathedral so as to face the 
altar where the performers were staged. The show was structured in a similarly formal 
manner, being segmented into a 'programme' format, comprising a set number of pieces. 
These  included  some  of  Rutman's  more  notable  works:  Song  of  the  Steel  Cello and 
Dresden – both pieces featuring improvisation based on loose musical  structures,  the 
latter of which was built around a narrative 'sonic depiction' of the bombing of the city of 
Dresden.
Whilst such formalities may not come as a surprise given the Cathedral setting, 
what may seem more unusual is that, prior to the show, the performers had erected a 
ten-speaker surround-sound system in the space with which to amplify a bow chime, a 
steel cello, and various other forms of instrumentation. Inevitably, the acoustic quality of 
the Cathedral during the performance drastically altered. 
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The bow chime, at its most extreme, emit excessively loud, deep, pulsing tones. 
The tones were so deep, in fact, that one feared the sound may drop from the bottom of 
the frequency spectrum, and disappear to one's audible senses, becoming replaced only 
by the tactile sensation of infra-sonic undertones pulsating, lulling and swaying the body. 
When this loud and low tone hit my body – and the word 'hit' here seems wholly justifed – 
I felt my internal organs being viscerally shaken, as though a frenzied force were entering 
every contour of my inner being. 
The  seismic  eruption  of  sound  energy  created  at  this  moment  engulfed  the 
surrounding environment. I could feel the foors quake beneath my feet, the walls shiver, 
and my seat shake vigorously. The tones proceeded around and through obstacles, they 
proceeded  to  the  furthest  depths  of  the  space,  and  were  perceived  by  myself  in  a 
rebounded, de-localized form from all angles imaginable. Such an efect saw the erosion 
of  all  sense of  acoustic  spatiality.  No longer  could I  orient  my attentions around the 
soundscape as before; all  I  could hear at any angle I  turned was that deep, pulsating 
sound surround me. 
Further, I began to lose all contact with the acoustic horizon. The Cathedral space 
within which I was situated – which previously displayed a subtle communal blur of the 
soft reverberant echoes of its inhabitants – became bombarded by a mass infux of sound. 
No longer could I choose what or who or what not or who not to listen to, for in the midst 
of this space, I could hear no other sound than that of the bow chime. Confronted by this 
sound, in fact, it seemed hard to imagine anything that could equal, not least surpass, its 
might.  Were I  to  scream at  the very  top of  my voice,  no one would answer  my call. 
Doubtless nobody would hear me at all.
My feelings at the point lead me to recall a book by David Toop entitled Ocean of 
Sound (1995), the title of which acts as a metaphor to describe what sound-ecologist R. 
Murray Schafer originally termed 'the soundscape' (see Schafer, 1994). Metaphorically, I 
could perhaps equate the feeling described in this account to that which one imagines 
might be experienced deep under an ocean: the feeling of being utterly submerged.
Yet, if I were to utter the words, 'immersed in an ocean of sound', this feels to me 
to be wholly unsatisfactory in articulating the experience of this sound. Its loudness was 
more invasive and threatening than a mere immersion, which to me implies some degree 
of  safety and security.  Indeed,  this sound was so loud as to be terrifying,  horrifying, 
unsettling, unnerving. It felt like a paralysing shock; an attack whose immensity short-
circuited  and  morbidly  threatened  every  one  of  my  physical  dependencies.  It  felt  as 
though it would drive my body to its limits; as though it were trying to shake the life out 
of me; to annihilate me from the inside out.
Indeed, the feeling of 'drowning in an ocean of sound' seems more ftting; the 
feeling of sheer terror being not simply completely immersed in a substance, but rather, 
having that substance completely overwhelm and engulf the body. It is the momentary 
feeling of being swallowed; the moment after the last breath has expired, and all the body 
can do is submit to the invasion, cease fghting, remove the defence barriers, and allow 
the invading force full, unconditional entry to the fortress of the body. 
Whilst this 'invasion' of sound may well in fact not lead to the body's demise, one 
still feels possessed, colonized, haunted. One feels overwhelmed, helpless, unable to ofer 
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resistance. Demise lingers in the imagination, as though perpetually poised on the brink 
of death; as though perched on the threshold to oblivion.  
Terror and delight: Burke's sublime.
So what of sublimity? It is my intention in this work, we will recall, to consider the 
association between this experience and the sublime; to consider for what reason these 
characteristics might give rise to the feeling of sublimity. A clue here might be found in 
the numerous suggestions of fear, trepidation, and even terror, that underlie this account. 
These suggestions are perhaps exemplifed by phrases such as, 'demise lingers in the 
imagination, as though perpetually poised on the brink of death', and 'drowning in an 
ocean  of  sound'.  I  mentioned in  the  previous  section  that  in  some formulations,  the 
sublime is considered to paradoxically stem from the displeasure associated with fear, 
horror and terror. In this section, I shall attempt to argue that this particular experience 
may well be bound with one such formulation of sublimity; a formulation conceived by 
Irish-born philosopher, Edmund Burke (1729-1797).
Before I continue with my discussion on the bow chime specifcally, to outline the 
grounds of the forthcoming discussion, I would like to spend a few pages frst sketching 
out Burke's thoughts on the sublime, which are documented primarily in his 1757 text, A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful  (2007).13
As I briefy mentioned, Burke's  Enquiry (as I  shall call it), calls attention to the 
experience of terror; by which I mean to say, it is to the experience of terror that Burke 
traces the 'source' of the sublime. Burke declares at the work's opening that, “[w]hatever is 
ftted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any 
sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operatives in a manner analogous 
to terror, is a source of the sublime” (Burke, 2007: Part 1, section VII). 
At a cursory glance, such an explanation may seem to characterise the sublime 
feeling as inherently negative and displeasing; as an experience bound with fear, with 
horror, and with pain. Burke later asserts however that a mode of pleasure can indeed be 
derived from such an experience. As he suggests: “if the pain and terror are modifed so 
as not to be actually noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not 
conversant  about  the  present  destruction of  the  person,  as  these emotions  clear  the 
parts ... they are capable of producing delight” (Burke, 2007: Part 4, Section VII.). 
What Burke is suggesting here then is that one may “delight in sublime terror so 
long as actual danger is kept at bay” (Shaw, 2006: 54). So, as an example, there is an 
evident diference between engaging in a fght for survival and contemplating it from afar: 
whilst “the former involves a real possibility of annihilation, the latter treats it merely as 
an idea” (ibid). Pain, terror and violence, thus, must either be modifed, or mitigated by 
the efects  of  distance for Burke's  sublime feeling  to arise.  As Burke  declares:  “When 
danger  or pain press too nearly,  they are incapable of giving delight,  and are simply 
13Burke also remarks on the sublime in a lesser known text, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1969), 
which sees Burke extend the terms of his aesthetic analysis to the domain of politics. The event that prompted 
this renewed enquiry – as the name might suggest – was the French Revolution, which was inaugurated by 
the fall of the Bastille in Paris on 14 July 1789. 
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terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifcations, they may be, and they 
are delightful” (Burke, 2007: Part 1, Section VII.).
As we briefy established in the previous section though, the sublime is often 
considered to involve a contradictory feeling of pleasure  and pain. Accordingly, Burke 
does indeed note that the 'delight' that he considers to arise in the sublime moment is 
“not [in fact] pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with 
terror” (Burke, 2007: Part 4, Section VII). In a moment, I shall examine in a little more 
depth  exactly  why  Burke  uses  the  term  “delight”  and  rejects  that  of  “pleasure”. 
Beforehand,  though,  it  is  necessary  to  defne the  moment  of  Burke's  sublime  a  little 
further. 
We have established already that the sublime for Burke is that which presents 
pain, terror and violence as modifed or mitigated by the efects of distance. For Burke, 
the weak or moderated states of pain or terror that such (sublime) objects arouse are 
ones which cause a kind of shock and consequential invigoration (Crowther, 1989: 8). 
Such a thing, Burke associates with the passion of astonishment. As he suggests: “The 
passion caused by the great and sublime ... is astonishment: and astonishment is that 
state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In 
this case the mind is so entirely flled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, 
nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it” (Burke, 2007: Part 2, Section 
I.). However, as Burke continues: “Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far 
from being produced by them, it  anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an 
irresistible force” (ibid). Refning this process slightly, we might suggest that the sublime 
moment induces a “temporary dislocation of sensibilities that [later] force the observer 
into mental action” (Nye, 1996: 6). 
The emphasis here both on the initial mental strain on cognition and the mind's 
subsequent response, gives us a clue as to Burke's distinction of the term 'delight' in 
opposition to that 'pleasure'. For Burke, “[p]leasure of every kind quickly satisfes; and, 
when it is over, we relapse into indiference, or,  rather, we fall  into a soft tranquillity 
which is tinged with the agreeable color of the former sensation” (Burke, 2007: Part 1, 
Section III.).  Conversely,  the word 'delight' for Burke, “express[es] the sensation which 
accompanies the removal of pain or danger” (ibid: Section IV.), and which consequently 
leaves the mind “in a state of much sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe, in a sort of 
tranquillity shadowed with horror” (ibid: Section III.). 
To this end, in the sublime moment, when confronted by the 'terrible' object, the 
mental action which hurries us on by an irresistible force could be redefned, in fact, as 
the means by which we contract or perhaps even cease the 'painful' mental strain placed 
on  the  mind  beforehand.  And,  it  is  precisely  for  such  a  reason  that  this  process  is 
accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  delight.  For  Burke,  this  whole  process  functions  as, 
essentially,  a  kind of  self-confrming labour for the mind. By this I  mean to say,  the 
consequential  act  of  exertion  elicited  by sublime objects  leaves  the  individual's  mind 
feeling “energised, more alive and thus more 'itself'” (Shaw, 2006: 54). Burke's sublime is 
ultimately  then  “a  feeling  deeply  bound  up  with  out  instinct  for  self-preservation” 
(Crowther, 1989: 8), and we might say that, in short, the delight in this experience arises 
from  the  “psychological  relief  at  having  managed  and  survived  a  …  [potentially] 
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threatening experience” (Shaw, 2006: 79).
Overall,  from this  brief  review we should perhaps note that  if  an object  –  or 
perhaps more pertinently, a sound –  were to evoke sublimity in Burke's sense, it would 
announce to the spectator or listener, in some way, the possibility of pain and above all of 
death. In other words, it would “announce that the gaze, the other, language or life will 
soon  be  extinguished  ...  that  it  is  possible  that  soon  nothing  more  will  take  place” 
(Lyotard, 1991: 84). Critically however, for delight to be produced, by way of distance or 
modifcation, something must be held back; annihilation must be suspended; we must 
become aware of our preservation from extinction. If this were not the case, then this 
experience would be incapable of giving delight, and would simply be terrible. In this 
circumstance – and only in this circumstance – “the soul … afect[s] the body as though it 
were experiencing some externally induced pain, by the sole means of representations 
that are unconsciously associated with painful situations” (Lyotard, 1991: 99).
Noise, anarchy, and chaos.
Having reviewed Burke's ideas on the sublime, it might be said that the case study 
of  the bow chime's  sound documented at  the opening of  this  section  smacks of  the 
thematic undertones of (Burkean) sublimity in its frequent references to pain, death and 
destruction.  Of  central  concern  here  are  suggestions  such  as  those  stating  that  its 
experience is akin to, for example, 'being poised on the brink of death', and 'drowning in 
an  ocean  of  sound'.  Such  statements  raise  concerns  we  might  identify  as  directly 
embodied in Burke's sublime, such as terror,  fear,  horror and so forth. They seem to 
suggest  that  the  experience  of  this  sound  is  in  some  way  bound  with  a  fear  of 
annihilation; a fear that this sound is in some way threatening, or at the least, frightening.
As we have established, though, whilst fear and terror may well be the necessary 
precursor to the Burkean sublime, fnding a sound to be terrible or horrible does not 
automatically signal sublimity per se. Assuming this to be the case is to neglect the fner 
points of Burkean sublimity: that being, the focus on delight via distance or modifcation. 
Nevertheless, before we can even think about trying to establish a connection between 
this sound and the (Burkean) sublime, it is worth frst spending a few words examining 
one possible connection between this sound and terror.
To achieve this task, I would like to turn away from Burke – whose remarks on 
sound and the 'acoustic sublime' are somewhat abrupt and vague – and toward a more 
recent study by French economist and political adviser Jacques Attali in his book, Noise: 
The Political Economy of Music (1985). Whilst Noise (as I shall call it) does not concern the 
sublime as such, it does at least position and examine quite explicitly the relationship 
between sound and terror – a relationship that Burke stops short of investigating in any 
real detail in the Enquiry.
The central concern of  Noise lies, naturally enough, with 'noise'; a word that in 
Attali's defnition of it, is used to describe a “resonance that interferes with the audition of 
a  message  in  the  process  of  emission”  (Attali,  1985:  26).  Attali's  noise  represents, 
basically, sounds that interrupt, sounds that interfere, obstruct or block. A number of 
other studies – most notably by Canadian sound-ecologist Murray Schafer (1974) –  write 
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of such sounds in relation to nuisance, and so betoken demands for noise-abatement 
legislation. Attali, however, endows his whole commentary on noise with a profoundly 
more unsettling twist.
For  Attali,  “Noise is  violence,  it  disturbs.  To  make  noise  is  to  interrupt  a 
transmission, to disconnect, to kill. It is a simulacrum of murder” (Attali, 1985: 26). In 
such a way, noise for Attali announces “the chaotic fraying of [social order, and of] its 
governing  codes.  Noise  attacks  the  status  quo,  the  norms  that  govern  relations  and 
dictate one's position as an individual. In essence, it embodies that which disturbs the 
strata of social relations” (LaBelle, 2000: 167). In fact, in the extreme, “[n]oise is a [literal] 
source of  pain.  Beyond a certain limit,  it  becomes an immaterial  weapon of  death … 
Diminished  intellectual  capacity,  accelerated  respiration  and  heartbeat,  hypertension, 
slowed  digestion,  neurosis,  altered  diction:  these  are  the  consequences  of  excessive 
sound in the environment” (Attali, 1985: 26). 
Noise, thus, is the acoustic equivalent of chaos and anarchy. It is pregnant with a 
threat to the governing codes of (social) order. It is an excessiveness that “stands against 
the resolve by which order protects itself[,] it butts up against the other side of language, 
an antithetical antagonism agitating the semiotic calm, disrupting the circuitry” (LaBelle, 
2000:  173).  Noise,  also,  announces  a  pernicious  agenda;  it  is  “a  power  founding  its 
legitimacy on the fear it inspires” (Attali, 1985: 26). And in such a way, for Attali, noise 
should be considered “a threat of death” (ibid), and its experience “a little bit like being 
killed” (ibid: 28).
The bow chime, as outlined in the case study above, might seem to bear the 
properties of a potent form of noise in that it  interrupts,  or interferes with, all  other 
acoustic events or emissions, and thereby forces the listener to absorb and attempt to 
critically assess a barrage of sound from which there is no escape. Attali may well ofer, 
then, one quite ftting proposal as to why the sound of the bow chime could be productive 
of terror: it interrupts the perceptions of the listener like a moment of chaos; a lapse in 
the coherence of social order. 
But what, then, of sublimity? If we were to take the view that the bow chime is 
productive of noise in the strictest sense, then this experience surely would be incapable 
of  procuring  the  delight  of  the  Burkean  sublime;  a  delight  that  announces,  in  the 
threatening void of fear and pain, that everything is not over. Surely, after all, noise in 
Attali's terms threatens a kind of descent into social anarchy that acts counter to Burkean 
sublimity  and its stress  on safety  and security.  Noise represents,  in  other words,  the 
precise antithesis of Burkean sublimity as it is considered the  direct  harbinger of chaos 
and violence. So in just what sense then might this particular experience be considered 
sublime?
Sacrifce and sublimity.
Before hazarding an answer to this question, it might be useful to frst explore a 
further set of remarks that Attali makes in  Noise – the emphasis of which, this time, is 
upon music.  In  fact,  Attali's  primary task in  his  book  Noise –  aside from,  of  course, 
delineating a profle of noise itself – is to trace the genealogy of music and situate its role 
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socially  and  culturally  by  mapping  its  functions  via  a  series  of  tropes:  Sacrifcing, 
Representing, Repeating, and Composing. For Attali, “all of these networks are co-present 
… [and so,] music has not passed simply from one stage to another … [but rather] all 
phases coexist in our complex interactions with music” (Cranny-Francis, 2005: 69). Of 
particular interest to this discussion is the frst trope: the sacrifce.
The Sacrifcial phase of Attali's schema concerns a primordial and/or primitive 
form of music and music-making. It concerns a phase we might understand as prevalent 
before music was commodifed for its exchange-value – its political function then being 
to enact the process of exchange via representation. It concerns a phase that we might 
understand as prevalent, also, long before the advent of recording technology – and mass 
production via  repetition.  The  function of  such a  music  Attali  sees quite  simply  as  a 
means to confrm “the possibility of society [and order], whilst encoding (in the noise it 
channels) the possibility of its subversion or collapse” (Cranny-Francis, 2005: 69). 
Broadly speaking, such a music thus presents “[n]oise given form according to a 
code (in other words, according to rules of arrangement and laws of succession, in a 
limited space, a space of sounds) that is theoretically knowable by the listener” (Attali, 
1985: 25). Thus, if noise is a weapon, and its experience is 'a little bit like being killed', 
then (sacrifcial) music “is the formation, domestication, and ritualization of that weapon” 
(Attali, 1985: 24). It “constitutes communication with this … threatening noise … [and 
thus] has the explicit function of reassuring” (ibid: 27); it has the function of controlling 
panic, transforming panic into joy, and dissonance into harmony.
So in what sense, then, might this idea relate to the experience of the bow chime? 
In the earlier literature review, we might recall that I cited David Chapman in concluding 
that the position of sound-sculpture in relation to established western musical culture, 
represents “a disavowal of [its]  codes and conventions [and] ...  a  desire  [to reconnect 
with] ... the fundamental materiality of sound beyond the codes and practices of music” 
(Chapman, 2003: 7). In the specifc case of Dislocation, I would suggest that the relation 
between the bow chime and the codes and practices of the western music tradition is 
perhaps not quite as broken as Chapman makes out. Though I will admit its relation is a 
little slackened,  and certainly not as strong as in many other cases (such as classical 
recitals  and the like),  on the part  of the performers/organisers,  it  is  still  not hard to 
identify  some  level  of  adherence  to  well-established  (social  and  musical)  codes  and 
conventions.
Rutman's engagement with the sound of the bow chime itself is a case in point. 
Whilst admittedly not grounded in the more rigorous conventions of the western music 
tradition  –  such  as  equal  temperament  and  rules  of  harmony  –  Rutman's  pieces  did 
possess loosely improvised structures equatable to musical form. One piece that featured 
as part of the  Dislocation  show entitled Dresden, for example, ofered a step-by-step 
'sonic depiction' of the bombing of the city of the Dresden – a primitive musical form in 
contrast  to  the  greats  of  the  western  music  tradition  perhaps,  but  a  musical  form 
nonetheless. We perhaps cannot forget, also, that the  Dislocation  event itself followed 
quite a strict set of formal customs. The performers and listeners, for example, were 
separated into counterpoised groups; and the entire Dislocation show was structured in a 
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programme format comprising a set number of pieces. In each of these examples can be 
found a wealth of formalities and etiquettes, each well established and widely employed in 
the western music tradition.
Given, then, the earlier suggestion that this sound was comparable to noise, and 
given these recent comments that the performance of this noise was couched in various 
codes and conventions, we may well cast this sound as a form of 'sacrifcial music': as 
“[n]oise given form according to a code (in other words, according to rules of arrangement 
… )  that  is  theoretically  knowable  by  the  listener”  (Attali,  1985:  25).  Of  course,  the 
particular  codes  and  conventions  I  have  presented  as  examples  here  are  in  no  way 
exhaustive, and we may well continue to highlight other examples to strengthen this link. 
However, perhaps the important point to note in respect of the intentions of this project 
and the Burkean sublime, is Attali's idea that through the presence of order, the terror 
and pernicious threat of noise is rendered innocuous: order tempers noise's violence, and 
neuters its disorder, and thus serves the explicit function of reassuring that danger is 
held back. 
However, before we resume discussing the sublime specifcally,  we might also 
stress that despite functioning to reassure, in Attali's terms such a music is seen to brush 
against uncontrollability, to firt with the beyond – hence the term 'sacrifce'. In fact, for 
Attali, whilst music may respond to the terror of noise through ritualization, it “rebounds 
in the feld of sound like an echo of the sacrifcial  channelization of violence” (Attali, 
1985: 28). In such a way, then, music's function is analogous to a sacrifce: if “listening to 
noise is a little bit like being killed … [then] listening to music is to attend a ritual murder, 
with all the danger, guilt, but also the reassurance that goes along with that” (ibid).
The  suggestion  here  then  is  that  the  Dislocation  show presented  a  ritualistic 
enactment  of  disorder,  a  domestication  of  violence,  a  channelization  of  anarchy.  It 
suggests that it presented “the fragile order of the ritual … an unstable order on the edge 
of danger, harmony on the edge of violence” (Attali, 1985: 123). It characterises the bow 
chime's sound, furthermore, as music that firts with the beyond; as music divorced from 
the terror of noise by the merest nuance; as music that presents noise given form, that 
presents terror with reassurance and security. From this point, I would suggest it to be 
only  a  small  jump back to the (Burkean)  sublime,  and an  understanding of  why this 
experience evoked sublimity. 
The Burkean sublime, we will recall, announces to the spectator or listener the 
possibility of pain – in this case, via the terror of noise. Yet, the actual source of pain is 
held back or modifed – in this case, via the forms and codes of music. As such, any 
displease or terror gives way to a feeling of delight, thus meaning that the experience of 
Dislocation, with its loud, overwhelming sound, prompted a kind of tranquility shadowed 
with horror; a sense of being teetering on the edge of nothingness, of being teetering on 
the edge of annihilation. 
Summary.
To summarise, in this section I have suggested that sublimity could be aroused by 
the  extreme  intensity  of  amplitude  observable  in  a  show  featuring  Rutman  entitled 
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Dislocation. In this experience, the tone was noted as immensely loud, to the extent that 
it  created a  colossal  acoustic  profle that  ostensibly  destroyed all  other  modalities  of 
acoustic reference and expression. I described this experience as being akin to 'drowning 
in  an  ocean  of  sound',  and  described  it  as  'so  loud  as  to  be  terrifying,  horrifying, 
unsettling, unnerving'.
The stress of this experience on terror and horror presents striking relevance to 
the Burkean formulation of the sublime; a formulation in which a subject is struck with 
terror and astonishment, but fnds delight in the fact that any actual danger is modifed or 
mitigated by the efects of distance. In the case of the bow chime, as represented by the 
Dislocation show, I suggested terror to be linked to the notion of noise; noise being an 
excessiveness that stands against the resolve of order. However – fulflling the demand of 
Burkean sublimity for security – I also suggested that, being couched in various codes and 
conventions of the western music tradition, the would-be terror, even anarchy of noise is 
rendered innocuous. Such an order, I suggested, reassures that danger is held back or 
modifed.
In the following section, I shall turn to a further case study of the bow chime and 
its sound which also focuses upon a performance of Rutman's. Again, I shall attempt to 
relate this experience to a particular idea as to the nature of the sublime – though in this 






Case Study 2: Deserted space/deserted time.
At some point during the summer of 2008, I witnessed Rutman perform on his 
bow  chime  in  a  Berlin  nightclub,  as  part  of  what  the  establishment  called  a  'Noise 
Festival'.14 The venue of the event seemed to have been converted from an abandoned 
power station or something similar – the origins of which were apparent in the crumbling 
walls,  brutal  steel construction pillars and copious additions of grafti.  An installation 
called The Noizemachine had been constructed in the particular space in which Rutman 
was to perform. This installation consisted of what seemed to be a random agglomeration 
of  rubbish  and  junk:  a  surgeon's  bed  with  a  spinning,  noise-emitting  megaphone 
attached to its head, a propellor, various sized speakers, radars, tiny circuit boards, and 
all manner of other such things. Each of these objects – even if only in the most minute 
way –  contributed to  a  ferocious cacophony;  a  cacophony echoed in  the surrounding 
rooms,  the  spill  of  whose  sounds  penetrated  my  perceptions.  I  could  hear  amplifed 
shouting from one room; the pounding clang of metal being beaten from another; harsh, 
deafening clamours from another still.
Unfazed by the general commotion though, Rutman performed in the centre of 
this space,  amongst all  of  the noise and the noise-emitting objects.  His performance 
bore many of the qualities already discussed in the previous case study. Some kind of 
surround-sound amplifcation rig had been constructed in the space, allowing the bow 
chime to fll the room with penetrating, intensely loud sound. The sound was so loud, in 
fact,  that even the existing noise of the venue – the acoustic spill  from other rooms, 
people talking and shouting and the like – became hard to discern. However, particularly 
notable in this performance was the bow chime's tendency to produce what might be 
called a “fat line” of sound. 
The bow chime presented extended, extremely long tones, possessing a pitch 
that remained unchanged and unchanging. It presented a straight line of sound; a fat 
swathe of  noise,  possessing little personality  or progression.  After the tone began,  it 
remained  continuous  and  static  through  and  throughout  time.  Intensity  remained 
constant, pitch remained constant, even timbre remained constant.
It was, perhaps, a little similar to the humming of machinery: ever-present and 
14Referring to Schlagstrom festival, held at Club Maria, Berlin.
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always  operational,  but  at  the  same  time,  fat,  lifeless,  afectless.  It  was,  the  non-
corporeal,  afect-fattened  voice  of  the  artifcial;  a  voice  aloof  to  expression  and 
articulation, its only interest and desire being continual production.
I perhaps cannot say how long the tones actually sounded. I can only note how 
long it  seemed to sound, in my perceptual encounter with it. And indeed, after a time 
listening to this fat swathe of sound, I eventually lost all grasp of the actualities of its 
length. After a time, past and present seemed to blur and my memory of the sound's birth 
frayed and dissolved.  Its  temporal  boundaries swelled into a  realm beyond all  critical 
discernment.  It  seemed  simply  too  long  to  grasp;  too  long  to  fathom as  a  discrete 
duration. It seemed boundless, immeasurable, endless. It seemed never to end – or the 
reverse, it seemed never to have begun.
As  an  image,  the  duration  of  this  sound  could  be  characterised  through 
featureless  (meaningless)  horizontality  or  extension,  represented  perhaps  by  the 
desertscape,  or  even  the  wasteland.  Deserted  space.  Deserted  time.  Abandoned,  or 
perhaps never discovered, such an image in my mind is empty and boundless, bereft of 
life, or even of the residue or remnants of life. Nothing exists in such a space apart from 
the fat plane extending indefnitely into the horizon. Perhaps it even extends forever, into 
the infnite – certainly there are no signs suggesting otherwise. Progression in this space 
is futile and worthless; an exhausting, hopeless, perhaps even absurd exercise. 
The  'sonic  wasteland'  of  this  sound,  as  I  shall  call  it,  is  likewise  simply  an 
expanse. It presents to me an absence: an absence of presence, at least of anything other 
than  itself.  It  is  unwavering,  uncompromising,  indefnite,  unspecifed,  unlimited, 
unrestricted. Its scale is impossible to calculate or measure, or even predict. It is simply 
an excess; an overstraining and over-demanding expanse.
Being lost: Kant's sublime.
So, for a second time, we are again confronted by the question of sublimity, and 
the  notion's  relevance  to  this  experience.  For  what  reason,  might  we ask,  could  the 
characteristics detailed in this case study give rise to the feeling of sublimity? Why is this 
particular  experience  sublime?  What,  indeed,  are  the  mechanisms  underlying  this 
experience's sublimity?
As there are no direct references in this case study to danger or terror, or any of 
the other traits which characterised the previous discussion, we might discount sublimity 
of a kind as outlined by Burke. This experience clearly represents sublimity of a diferent 
kind; of a kind not so much concerned with one's instinct for self-preservation, and more, 
we might  postulate,  with  one's  capacity  for  critical  discernment;  with  one's  ability  to 
discern, or not discern as the case may be, the temporal boundaries of the bow chime's 
sound. To this end, I shall attempt to argue in this section that this particular case study, 
in contrast to the previous section, may be bound with a slightly later formulation of 
sublimity; a formulation conceived by eighteenth-century German philosopher, Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804). As in the previous section, I would again like to spend a few initial 
words outlining the grounds of Kant's sublime before I commence commentary on the 
bow chime specifcally.
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Kant's thoughts about the sublime are documented primarily in his 1790 text, the 
'Analytic  of  the  Sublime',  which  forms  the  centrepiece  of  his  work,  The  Critique  of 
Judgement (1951) – itself the concluding part of his trilogy of works comprising the 1781 
text,  The Critique of Pure Reason (1992), and the 1788 text,  The Critique of Practical 
Reason (1997).15 Though my study will only concern itself with the former, in the 'Analytic' 
(as I shall call it), Kant in fact defnes two types of sublime: the 'mathematical' and the 
'dynamic'.
Whilst  his  dynamic sublime  echoes some of  the  themes  of  Burke's  –  such as 
terror,  horror,  and  so  forth  –  Kant's  mathematical  sublime  alternatively  urges  us  to 
consider questions of form and its cognitive comprehension. The mathematical sublime, 
indeed, for Kant is “to be found in an object ... devoid of form, so far as it immediately 
involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of limitlessness” (Kant, 1951: 
104). What Kant has in mind by the term 'limitlessness' can be illustrated as follows: “If we 
view a mountain in the distance it has a characteristic shape which enables us to describe 
it as 'a mountain'. But suppose that we are standing at its base with ... its highest reaches 
shrouded in mist. Under these conditions we lack the vantage-point which would dispose 
us to simply describe it as 'a mountain'. Rather, our conceptual faculties cannot take in 
the sheer immensity of the peak ... The mountain seems, in our close and immediate 
perceptual encounter with it, to be a limitless phenomenal mass or aggregate, without any 
overall defning shape or form” (Crowther, 1989: 79). 
The mathematical sublime thus might be said to refer “to things which appear 
either formless ...  or  which have form but,  for reasons of  size,  exceed our ability to 
perceive such form” (Shaw, 2006: 78). Kant calls such things the 'absolutely great' (Kant, 
1951: 104),  meaning that which is beyond magnitude; that which is beyond a merely 
relative dimension of size, scale or intensity. Such objects, in other words, “are considered 
formless because we cannot unify its elements in sense intuition” (Shaw, 2006: 78). By 
which  I  mean  to  say,  when  faced  “with  a  seemingly  endless  sequence  of  sensible 
intuitions, the imagination is overcome by the impossibility of ever accounting for the 
sequence in its entirety” (ibid: 81).
Kant's distinction here of the term 'imagination' is critical. In Kant's lexicon, the 
word 'imagination' denotes the faculty of mind that schematises and grasps the sensory 
world in images and 'forms'. In other words, the imagination synthesises or represents the 
products  of  sensible  intuition  (that  being,  one's  raw,  unmediated  perception  of,  for 
example,  warmth  or  hardness),  before  those  products  are  thought through  the 
understanding  (Shaw,  2006:  74).  In  any  normal  circumstance  then,  the  harmony  of 
imagination  and  understanding  draws  the  raw  immediacy  of  nature  (that  being,  the 
evidence of the senses) under the domain of concepts. The case of the sublime, however, 
presents  a  diferent  scenario  altogether:  through  aesthetic  estimation,  the  observer's 
imagination is unable to 'take in' the magnitude that confronts him/her – and despite 
devices such as computers being able to present some kind of estimate of this magnitude 
in numerical form, from an aesthetic point of view, the observer is unable to form a sense 
15Kant also discusses the subject of the sublime in an earlier and lesser known text entitled Observations on 
the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1960). 
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of it as a real magnitude. Rather, at such a moment, “the logical estimation of magnitude 
advances ad infnitum with nothing to stop it” (Kant, 1951: 102). The feeling encountered 
in such a moment, as commentator Thomas Weiskel astutely observes, is “one of on and 
on, of being lost” (Weiskel, 1974: 26).
At this point, we might see emerging the beginnings of a correspondence with the 
case study documented at the opening of this section – the concern of which, was the 
long duration  (and  thus  form)  of  the  bow chime's  notes.  The  length  of  tone,  it  was 
suggested earlier, 'swelled into a realm beyond all critical discernment', it was 'simply too 
long to fathom as a discrete entity'. Here, we fnd refected Kant's notion of greatness or 
vastness of magnitude; we fnd refected Kant's idea that the imagination will be unable to 
'take in' a sheer, seemingly endless sequence of sensible intuitions. Also, we fnd refected 
– in a quite literal sense – Weiskel's assertion of such a moment as the feeling of on and 
on. The tone, we might say, seems to have extended to the point at which it is too long 
for us to grasp. The scale it presents is too large to be credited. The criterion and the 
power to think it surpass all human standards of sense. Given this observable accordance, 
it may be reasonably argued that this particular experience bore all the criteria of Kant's 
mathematical sublimity. Still, the full disposition of this particular formulation remains to 
be uncovered. 
Averting disaster. 
We  have  gathered  that  confronted  by  the  bow  chime's  excessive  length,  the 
mind's demand for the comprehension and presentation of the sound's  totality  (that is, 
the mind's demand for closure) leads to a certain failure of the imagination; a failure to 
present the seemingly formless magnitude of sound into a full  and unifed image. We 
might say, perhaps, that the sound's sheer scale appears to frustrate judgement; that it 
threatens to overwhelm the mind's powers of comprehension, perhaps even calling the 
autonomy of judgement itself into question (Shaw, 2006: 78). This is a point highlighted 
by Kant,  who notes how in  such a  moment,  such objects  seem “in  point  of  form to 
contravene the ends of our power of judgement, to be ill adapted to ... [and] as it were, an 
outrage  on  the  imagination”  (Kant,  1951:  91).  Perhaps  it  might  be  said  that  one's 
imagination, “has so much difculty in grasping … [such a sound's] manifold that the … 
[sound] seems to defeat the very end of cognition itself” (Crowther, 1989: 82). 
If  is  this  is  an  initially displeasing,  humbling  experience  however,  in  Kant's 
schema, any displeasure is later to be ofset by the intervention of another faculty of the 
mind: for  “[w]hen the imagination … is brought into a dissonant, or confictual, relation 
with the spontaneous faculty of understanding, an appeal is made to reason” (Gurlac, 
1990: 10).
In Kant's lexicon, the term 'reason' denotes the faculty of mind that leads us to 
conceive of 'ideas' which our intellect cannot demonstrate or present. Ideas such as that 
of  God,  the  world,  freedom,  justice,  infnity:  each  of  these  is  a  case  in  point.  Kant 
describes such ideas as 'supersensible' (Kant, 1951: 102) – a term literally meaning above 
or beyond the sensible – in that they transcend the realms of the world as given to us by 
the  evidence  of  the  senses.  By  this  I  mean  to  say,  such  ideas  transcend  all  of  the 
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contingent conditions and determinations of nature, and so enable us to “pursue thought 
without restriction” (Shaw, 2006: 75).
The  mind's  capacity  to  call  upon such  ideas  is  signifcant  in  the  case  of  the 
sublime  as  it  enables  us,  in  a  way,  to  sustain  the  seemingly  'impossible'  object  of 
sublimity. Indeed, whilst in the sublime moment, “the logical estimation of magnitude 
[may well] advance ... ad infnitum with nothing to stop it” (Kant, 1951: 102), through our 
reason, at such a moment we can conceive of even the infnite – itself an 'idea' which can 
never  be  presented  or  experienced,  and  so  is  drawn  from  within  the  realm  of  our 
supersensuous being.
Called  upon  following  the  imagination's  humiliation  and  failure,  reason's 
intervention functions, thus, to reconcile the 'disastrous'  moment beforehand – and it 
does so through the acquisition of a 'super-added idea' of the impossible object's totality 
(Crowther, 1989: 80; Shaw, 2006: 80; Lyotard, 1991: 98).  This amounts to what Kant 
considers to be a 'negative' presentation. In other words, it dislocates the faculties among 
themselves, and in fact prompts something of “a confict between … the faculties of the 
subject, [that is,] between the faculty to conceive of something and the faculty to 'present' 
something” (Lyotard, 1992: 6).
Whilst in the current case study of the bow chime, the prolonged tone observably 
provoked an initial failure and frustration of the imagination, in considering these recent 
comments, we may well also fnd in this experience a similar reconciliatory action. Indeed, 
in this case study, the prolonged sound of the bow chime was frequently  articulated with 
such ideas as  the  'boundless',  the  'immeasurable',  and the 'endless'.  Numerous  other 
suggestions also depicted its length more specifcally in terms of the infnite, or some 
related  concept.  As  an  example:  'it  seemed  ...  suprabiological,  as  though  it  receives 
transplants and lives forever'. 
The point here, of course, is not that this sound literally extends forever – clearly 
we are considering a tone of fnite duration. Rather, this particular experience represents 
a moment when the mind becomes lost, when it looses a grasp upon its perceptions. It 
represents a moment, in other words, when the tone  seemed unbounded and formless, 
when it  seemed to extend forever.  Calling upon such ideas as that of  infnity,  of the 
boundless, of the immeasurable, or the endless, attests to a compensatory movement of 
the mind; a moment when reason steps in to control the perceived excess of experience. 
It attests to a moment when reason induces the mind to postulate ideas involving higher 
fnality; ideas that can reconcile the disaster sufered by the imagination; ideas that can 
reclaim for the mind the 'impossible' object. 
The bow chime's prolonged length then, in this example, is conceived in terms of 
rational  ideas,  despite  any  presentation  of  an  object  –  which  would  be  intended  to 
'display' that duration – lacking to the imagination. This experience, then, represents not 
so much a disruptive moment that brought critical thought to the point of crisis, but more 
a 'blip' in one's comprehension of experience; a stutter in the fow of coherence, if you 
will.  For  Kant,  such  a  disjunctive  movement  serves  a  number  of  functions,  however 
perhaps most notably, it prompts us to grasp  “a feeling … for a capacity within our minds 
that is essentially transcendent to (that is, free from) all determinations of nature” (Shaw, 
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2006: 83). The sublime, in other words,  draws us away from our sensuous experience 
towards a recognition of the 'higher' transcendental powers of reason that we have within 
us; powers that transcend the limits of the world as given to us by our senses. 
It is precisely from such a recognition that the pleasure in the sublime moment 
arises. As Kant declares: “The feeling of the sublime is ... at once a feeling of displeasure, 
arising from the inadequacy of the imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude 
… and  a  simultaneously  awakened  pleasure,  arising  from the  very  judgement  of  the 
inadequacy of the … faculty of sense being in accord with ideas of reason” (Kant, 1951: 
106).  In  simpler  terms,  the  imagination's  inadequacy  to  cope  with  the  formless 
phenomenon  involves  a  sense  of  pain  and  frustration.  Yet,  this  is  succeeded  by  “a 
powerful sense of relief (even elation) in so far as the formless object can be grasped as a 
totality in terms of a rational idea” (Crowther, 1989: 81).
Summary.
So, to summarise, in this section I have suggested that sublimity could be aroused 
by a prolonged duration of  tone,  in this case observable in a  certain performance of 
Rutman's  on  the  bow  chime.  In  this  experience,  the  tone  was  noted  as  'extended, 
extremely long, with a pitch that was unchanged and unchanging'.  It  was noted as 'a 
straight line of sound, a fat swath of noise, possessing little personality or progression'. 
In fact, the tone seemed so long as to provoke a feeling of on and on, a feeling of being 
lost and loosing a grasp on the actualities of its length.
This  aspect  of  being  lost  –  the  inability  to  cohere  or  discern  duration  and 
temporal  boundaries  –  I  have  suggested  presents  striking  relevance  to  the  Kantian 
formulation of the sublime; a formulation in which the imagination fails to synthesise all 
of the immediate perceptions of a seemingly formless duration into a full  and unifed 
imagine,  and  so  is  forced  to  turn  to  the  unbounded grasp of  reason to  reclaim the 
'impossible' object. This action thus gives rise to “a kind of cleavage within the subject 
between what can be conceived and what can be imagined or presented” (Lyotard, 1991: 
98); a dislocation which ultimately serves to exhibit one's inner powers of reason,  powers 
which can outreach in thought external objects that overwhelm our senses (Goldthwait, 
cited in Nye, 1996: 7).
In the following section, I shall turn to a further case study of the bow chime and 
its sound – though this time not a performance of Rutman's as has been the case in the 
previous two sections. Again, I shall attempt to relate this experience to a particular idea 
as to the nature of the sublime – although in this case, to do such a thing, I shall turn 




Halfway Between a Whale and 
a Squadron Bomber:
embracing the unpresentable.
Case Study 3: Shards of Broken Syntax.
I recall my frst encounter with the bow chime vividly. It was autumn, 2004, and I 
had been invited by my then undergraduate tutor, Adrian Palka, to attend a guest lecture 
conducted by himself and David Chapman. Unknown to me what the lecture was exactly 
about (I knew that it concerned 'sound-sculpture' in some sort of a way), I was quite taken 
aback upon entering the lecture theatre. Positioned at the front of the space was a bizarre 
object: a large metal sheet mounted on a metal frame, with several metal rods protruding 
from its heart. Not long after, this strange object was introduced as the bow chime: a 
'playable sound-sculpture' invented in the 1960s by a man named Bob Rutman.  Chapman 
and Palka's talk provided further art-historical grounding and background information on 
the bow chime, and I recall them speaking about Luigi Russolo, Harry Partch, the Baschet 
Brothers  and other such fgures.  Soon after,  however, a demonstration of the sound-
sculpture itself followed.
Another fgure entered the space – who I have since found out was Mark Bowler, a 
recent  graduate  at  the  time  who  had  been  working  with  Palka  on  a  number  of 
performances using the bow chime and steel cello. Bowler approached the bow chime and 
drew a cello bow precariously across its rods a number of times. To my amazement, this 
simple  action  generated  the  most  exquisite  sound.  It  flled  the  room  with  a  slowly 
decaying sound-wave; one which seemed at once beautifully delicate, subtle, yet at the 
same  time,  powerful,  loud  and  dominating.  Bowler  then  proceeded  to  bow  more 
repeatedly, creating a long, extended, drone-like sound.
Cocooned within the simplicity of this lonesome, solitary tone moved an intense 
complexity of timbral coloration; a deluge of interweaving and intertwining colouration; 
an  orgy  of  undulations,  ripples  and  movement.  It  was,  perhaps,  a  little  similar  to  a 
running stream: the continual fow of water that, on the one hand, has a specifc direction, 
is subject to certain physical laws and restraints, yet on the other, has an internal dialogue 
in a  continual  struggle with itself  –  fghting,  rowing,  invading,  persuading.  Whilst  the 
stream's  direction  may  seem wholly  understandable,  its  inner  workings  –  the  ripples, 
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bubbles and undulations – appear incomprehensibly complex; constantly fuctuating; fuid 
yet directed; chaotic yet contained. Yet, this particular aspect is not what interested me 
the most about this timbre.
On hearing this sound, I recall my mind and memory frantically scrambling for 
determinacy; to ascertain the sound's identity; to categorise it, order it and classify it. 
However, strangely, and much to my surprise, I seemed incapable of achieving such a 
task.  Indeed,  in  the  encounter  with  this  timbre,  knowledge  seemed  inapplicable, 
incompetent and incomplete, impotent. Knowledge seemed no longer present. The timbre 
of this tone simply seemed incommensurable. 
At  this  moment,  and  considering  this  timbre,  I  found  stimulated  a  spree  of 
disparate  and  disjunct  representations;  open-ended  signifeds;  disjointed  ideas; 
fragmented memories.  All  it  seemed to yield was disjoined images,  shards of  broken 
syntax: I  heard the disembodied echoes of a thousand squadron bombers overhead. I 
heard the shadows of machinery, whirring, exchanging, moving and humming. I heard the 
deep, penetrating rumbles of an earthquake. I heard the roaring motion and fuidity of 
water, carefully, yet chaotically descend down a rocky ravine. I heard the pain and frailty 
of degradation. I  heard the soaring cosmic musings of an aurora in the ionosphere. I 
heard the glistening beauty of a calm ocean on a warm summer's eve, shimmering in the 
fading sunset. 
On the one hand, it seemed so natural, and so organic, that one imagines it had 
seeped up from the very centre of the Earth, and had leaked out through the fault lines 
and imperfections on the surface. On the other, however, it seemed to bear the distinct 
hallmarks of industrial and/or post-industrial noise, and would not sound out of place 
accompanied by a cacophony of excruciating scrapes and bangs and rumbles and whirs. It 
seemed to present – paradoxical as it may seem – a strange amalgam; an unsettling and 
absurd, ridiculous juxtaposition of monumental natural forces combined with industrial 
qualities.  It  seemed poised between man and nature;  halfway between a whale and a 
squadron bomber. 
But how could this be? Compulsively, of course, I felt forced to contemplate it, 
analyse it, inspect it: Is it possible? Is it real? Is it even happening? And indeed, it did seem 
to present a rich abundance of signifcance in which, intuitively perhaps, I grappled for 
some kind of defnition, clarity, and meaning. But nothing I could conceive seemed to give 
any sense to the sound – nothing yielded. Indeed, many sounds bear similar qualities, 
aspects or profles, but they are not quite this sound. This was something other; a fssure 
in my familiarity with the world;  an unknowable void upon which I  could only  dizzily 
hover. It presented to me a negation, a falling away from what I could grasp, seize, know, 
perceive.  For  this  was  something  unknown  to  me,  something  that  evaded  phrases. 
Unexplainable, Impassable – as an image, it could only be the abyss.
After the Sublime: Lyotard's sublime.
So again, and for the fnal time, we are confronted by the question of sublimity, 
and the term's relevance to this particular experience. Can we associate the experience 
detailed in this account with the sublime? And if so, what are the mechanisms underlying 
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its experience?
First of, as there are again no direct references to terror, danger, or horror listed 
in this case,  we may discount sublimity of a kind outlined by Burke.  This experience 
represents  less  a  violation  or  afront  as  exhibited  in  the  Burkean  formulation,  and 
something more like an encounter with what we might call 'the strange'. By that I mean to 
say that it presents to us the unfamiliar; it presents to us something unusual or surprising 
in a way that is unsettling or hard to understand. Indeed, in this case, the sound might be 
characterised  as  a  sort  of  perplexing  peculiarity;  an  'oddness'  that  stimulates  an 
unnerving curiosity. By this token, we may well rule out Kantian sublimity also: there are 
no direct suggestions pointing toward a boundlessness of form. Quite the reverse in fact, 
for the particular form of this sound (that form being, the tone's duration) is considered 
quite intelligible and indeed, presentable to the imagination, being described as 'a slowly 
decaying sound-wave'.
In the theme of the Kantian sublime, however, there perhaps lies a clue as to 
sublimity in this case. Indeed, in this particular encounter with 'the strange', if that is what 
this  is,  we  may  well  fnd  echoed  Kant's  characterisation  of  sublimity  as  a  disruptive 
moment  in  which  the  mind  fails  to  cohere  and  discern  properly  one's  experience;  a 
moment, that is, when the excesses of experience exceed the grasp of the mind. Also a 
frustrating and failing moment attesting to a critical inability, the notion of the strange, 
defned above, very much converges with the spirit of Kantian sublimity. Yet, at the same 
time, it is something completely separate. It is something more. Not so much simply a 
'blip'  in  one's  comprehension  of  forms,  this  encounter  is  something  more  radical:  a 
moment when our ability to understand the very materiality of sound itself is brought into 
question;  and a moment when any reconciliatory  action attempting to  reclaim and to 
'know' this sound seems utterly futile.
In this section, I shall attempt to argue that this particular experience may well be 
bound  with  a  third,  much  more  recent,  formulation  of  the  sublime;  a  formulation 
conceived  by  contemporary  French  philosopher,  Jean-François  Lyotard  (1924-1998). 
Again, as has been the case in the two previous sections, before I speak any further about 
the bow chime specifcally,  I  would like briefy to sketch out some of the grounds of 
Lyotard's  sublimity;  a  formulation  documented  in  a  number  of  his  shorter  texts  and 
essays.  These  include  his  essay,  'Answering  the  Question:  What  is  Postmodernism?'  – 
which  features  at  the  opening  of  his  book,  The  Postmodern  Explained  to  Children: 
Correspondence 1982-1985  (1992). As well,  the subject is mentioned in a number of 
lesser known texts, including, 'Newman: The Instant', 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde', 
and  'After  the  Sublime:  the  state  of  aesthetics'  –  all  of  which  feature  in  another  of 
Lyotard's book, The Inhuman: Refections on Time (1991). Though I shall refer in passing 
to other works, my central concern here is with the essay 'After the Sublime' – an essay 
which, perhaps more than any other, directs its attentions towards the sublime in sound 
and music.
In  contrast  to  those  ideas  presented  in  the  previous  discussions,  Lyotard's 
account of the sublime amounts less to a complete overhaul of previous thoughts about 
the subject, and more to a refnement of older ideas. Most consistently perhaps, Lyotard 
33
looks  towards  Kant's  earlier  defnition  of  the  sublime  as  the  grounding  for  his  own 
refnement of the notion. 
His particular approach to the subject varies between each essay. However, in the 
particular case of his essay, 'After the Sublime', Lyotard approaches the Kantian theme of 
the sublime in terms of the relation between form and matter. He suggests: “One of the 
essential  features revealed by Kant's  analysis  of  the sublime depends on the  disaster 
sufered by the imagination in the sublime sentiment … As every presentation consists in 
the 'forming' of the matter of the data, the disaster sufered by the imagination [in Kant's 
sublime] can be understood as the sign that the forms are not relevant” (Lyotard, 1991: 
136). However, with a view to resolving this paradox of an aesthetics without sensible and 
imaginative forms, with a view to allowing matter to stand when the forms are no longer 
there  to  make it  presentable,  we  already  know that  Kant  ultimately  turns toward the 
faculty  of  reason.  Thus,  “an  Idea  of  Reason  is  revealed  at  the  same  time  as  the 
imagination proves to be impotent in forming data” (ibid).
Lyotard's sublime is ultimately sympathetic to the general premise of Kant's in 
that he maintains the sublime moment to involve a certain 'disaster' sufered by the mind; 
a  disaster  sufered  in  the  confrontation  with  certain  phenomena  which  seem 
'unpresentable'  to  the  mind in  some way.  However,  he  does  hold  some quite  strong 
reservations  concerning the ultimately  reconciliatory  appeal  to  reason featured  in  the 
Kantian  schema  –  by  which  I  mean  the  closing  movement  that  reincorporates  the 
unfathomable immensity of the (sublime) object back into the 'safe fold' of reason. For 
Lyotard, indeed, the sublime exists precisely because of the incommensurability between 
the (sublime)  object  and our ability  to assimilate  it;  it  exists precisely because of the 
absurdity  spanning  the  gulf  between  the  theoretical  and  the  practical.  The  Kantian 
sublime – with its ultimately reconciliatory movement to reason –  thus represents for 
Lyotard nothing short of nostalgic reverie for the lost contents of the sublime.
By contrast, in Lyotard's confguration, the sublime is considered to be that which 
does not lead us to expect the slightest reconciliation. It is that which, instead, exposes “a 
basic incommensurability within our experience that neither reason nor understanding is 
capable of  resolving”  (Sim,  cited in  Shaw, 2006:  123).  In  a further  contrast  to Kant's 
sublime  and its  stress  upon an 'unpresentability'  of  form,  Lyotard  argues  that  in  his 
sublime experience, “matter [itself] is invoked in a way that is not fnalized, not destined” 
(Shaw,  2006:  124).  In  other  words,  in  Lyotard's  sublime,  matter  itself  resists  the 
imposition of  concepts; it  is  the very thing itself  which is  withdrawn from the mind's 
grasp; it is, indeed, the very thing itself which is 'unpresentable'. 
The sublime in  question then is  no longer the Kantian sublime.  Where in  the 
Kantian sublime the mind always arrives, belatedly as it were, to pronounce its judgement 
via  the  'higher'  faculty  of  reason,  in  Lyotard's,  Judgement  is  ultimately  kept  open, 
unresolved. The object of the sublime, as Lyotard explains, “is not waiting for anything, it 
does  not  call  on  the  mind  …  It  is  presence  as  unpresentable  to  the  mind,  always 
withdrawn from its grasp. It does not ofer itself to dialogue and dialectic” (Lyotard, 1991: 
142). Simplifed to the extreme then, Lyotard's sublime might be considered akin to a 
disruptive event that forces critical thought to the point of crisis; which might suggest 
that the title of his essay, 'After the Sublime',  means: “after the Kantian sublime … [it 
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means] another sublime – [a] sublime that can have no after, that cannot be the next 
stage in a sequence of moments” (Silverman, 2002: 228).
The strange and the sublime.
The notion  and  experience  of  'the  strange'  –  defned earlier  as  that  which  is 
unusual or surprising in a way that is unsettling or hard to understand – converges with 
Lyotard's notion of the sublime. As the idea of that which is strange, I suggested earlier, 
evokes an unnerving curiosity that could be said to represent a certain de-familiarisation 
with, or falling away from what can be known, seized, grasped, or perceived, so too does 
Lyotard's sublimity disrupt critical thought through invoking presence as unpresentable to 
the mind. However it is phrased, both cases suggest an unnerving moment; a moment 
when one's  ability  to  properly  grasp and understand one's  experience is  thrown into 
disarray. Lyotard's sublime then may seem poised to ofer credence to sublimity in the 
particular case study of the bow chime outlined above. Still, it is worth frst of all focusing 
our attentions upon Lyotard's more precise comments on his sublimity and its relation to 
sound.
We may have gathered from the review above that if a sound were to prompt 
sublimity in Lyotard's sense, then that sound would appear to the listener as presence 
unpresentable to the mind. As such, when considering the case of sublime sounds in 
'After the Sublime', Lyotard directs his discussion towards 'unpresentable' sounds; sounds 
that do not turn towards the mind; sounds withdrawn from the mind's grasp. However, we 
must stress that such an 'unpresentability' represents something of a departure from that 
exhibited in the previous section on Kant, in which I found the form of the bow chime's 
lengthy drones to,  as  it  were,  evade the grasp of  the mind.  Indeed,  in  this  instance, 
Lyotard is referring to a more inherent quality of sound: to its materiality; to its matter. He 
is  referring,  in  other  words,  to  an  unpresentable  matter  of  sound,  or  an 'immaterial' 
matter as he calls it (see, Lyotard, 1991: 140). Indeed, he is referring, in his words, to 
matter “for which the mind will not have been prepared, which will have unsettled it, and 
of which it  conserves only the feeling – anguish and jubilation – of an obscure debt” 
(Lyotard, 1991: 141).
The particular focus of Lyotard's attention here is  directed to  what  he calls  a 
sound's 'nuance' and 'timbre'. These Lyotard defnes as: “scarcely perceptible diferences 
between sounds … which are otherwise identical in terms of the determination of their 
physical parameters” (Lyotard, 1991: 140). Nuance and timbre are, in other words, what 
difer and defer; what makes the diference between one note on one instrument and the 
same note on another,  and thus what  also defer  the identifcation of  that  note.  Also 
though, for Lyotard nuance and timbre allow the introduction of what he calls an 'infnite 
continuum'  of  variation and diference  into  the  experience  of  listening to  sound (see 
Lyotard, 1991: 139-140). As he suggests: whilst we can normally “manage to determine a 
[sound] … by specifying pitch, duration and frequency[,]  ...  timbre and nuance … are 
precisely what [can] escape this sort of determination” (ibid: 139). In their more obscure 
and unheard manifestation – Lyotard notes synthesizers and gongs as examples here – 
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nuance and timbre can indeed reveal to the listener the “distress and despair of the exact 
division ... of sounds … according to graded scales and harmonic temperaments” (ibid: 
140). In this instance, they could well be defned as immaterial in presenting to the mind 
something for which it will not have been prepared; something unnervingly that does not 
ft into our current understanding of the world and the way it works.
This particular point is noteworthy given that in the present case study of the bow 
chime, the focus was similarly directed toward the unnerving, 'strange' timbre of the bow 
chime. Indeed, this particular account echoes many of Lyotard's assumptions as to how 
such an immaterial timbre will, as it were, reveal to the listener the distress and despair of 
exact divisions.  The timbre, it was suggested, seemed to be 'poised between man and 
nature', 'halfway between a whale and a squadron bomber' – both sentiments which draw 
our  attention  towards  the  unknown  and  the  unpresentable.  They  thus  imply  an 
unresolvable paradox; an impossible marriage between phenomena (a marriage between a 
whale  and  a  squadron  bomber);  something  that  has  slipped  between  divisions  and 
categorisations, something that exists outside of our current systems of discourse as we 
know them. In Lyotard's terms, such a thing describes “a singular, incomparable quality” 
(Lyotard, 1991: 141). It describes “something which is not addressed, [something which] 
does  not  address itself  to  the  mind”  (ibid:  142).  It  is,  surely,  “the  unpresentable  in 
presentation itself” (Lyotard, 1992: 9). It is, surely, immaterial matter. 
Is this it? Is it happening?
As  we  have  gathered  then,  the  bow  chime's  timbre  reveals  to  the  listener 
something unknown; it invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself. We might say, 
perhaps, that the timbre represents a stranger to consciousness; it represents something 
that  dismantles  consciousness,  something that  deposes consciousness and cannot  be 
formulated by it. Encountering such a thing, we have established, represents a moment of 
sublimity in Lyotard's sense of the word: a disruptive moment in which critical thought is 
forced to the point of crisis. In closing this section though, we might like to comment 
upon one further and quite critical point in Lyotard's sublime: the sense of pleasure that 
such a moment involves.
In  both  of  the  previous  discussions  on  Burke  and  Kant  we  might  recall  that 
sublimity has been suggested to involve a kind of contradictory sensation of pleasure and 
displeasure. So how, might we ask, does Lyotard's sublime moment compare? 
In the Kantian sublime, the failure of the imagination represented the pretext for 
displeasure,  whereas  the  reconciliatory  action  of  reason  was  considered  to  involve 
pleasure. Given that Lyotard's sublime is directly derived from the Kantian formulation, 
and  given  also  that  his  conceptualisation  of  the  term  stops  short  of  including  the 
reconciliatory action which for Kant is seen to give way to pleasure, one could be forgiven 
for  presuming  Lyotard's  sublime  to  constitute  simply  a  displeasing  moment  –  a 
displeasing  moment  in  which  the  mind  simply  fails  to  overcome  the  excesses  of 
experience. Yet, much like Kant before him, Lyotard also considers his sublime moment 
to involve a feeling of displeasure alongside pleasure – though he obviously arrives at this 
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conclusion by quite  diferent means. In fact,  Lyotard is  drawn here to an explanation 
closer in nature to the Burkean sublime. 
We should recall from an earlier section that Burke diagnosed the source of the 
sublime as terror; a diagnosis that Lyotard suggests to reveal that, for Burke, “the sublime 
is  kindled  by  the  threat  of  nothing  further  happening”  (Lyotard,  1991:  99).  What  is 
ultimately sublime for Burke, we should also recall though, is the feeling of delight in the 
face of danger; the knowledge that actual danger and pain – in whatever form that may 
take – is modifed or mitigated by the efects of distance. Such a feeling embodies for 
Lyotard a sense of reassurance; a feeling, in his words, “that something will happen” (ibid: 
84); a feeling that “despite everything within this threatening void … [that] something will 
[still] take place and will announce that everything is not over” (ibid). 
So how does this relate to Lyotard's sublime? In his essay, 'The Sublime and the 
Avant-garde' (featured in his book, The Inhuman (1991)), Lyotard suggests the disruptive 
moment of his sublime to embody the properties of an 'event'. This is not, for Lyotard, “a 
major  event  in the media sense,  [it  is]  not  even a small  event.  [It  is,  rather,  j]ust  an 
occurrence” (Lyotard, 1991: 84). What Lyotard has in mind here is a kind of condition of 
liminality; a condition wherein an unknown phenomenon “pends, is imminent, contiguous 
to the world of the already present” (Edwards, 2002: 263). The sublime object represents, 
in  other  words,  something  unformed  or  something  emerging;  something  that  stands 
outside  the  frame set  by  the  everyday  but  something  that  nevertheless  seems to  be 
making itself known. It represents, thus, a moment which is in the end “more a possibility 
or the promise of the event than the presence of one” (ibid: 262); and it represents a 
moment that, for Lyotard, prompts a series of questions: “Is it happening, is this it, is it  
possible?” (ibid: 90). More pertinently though, such an event is also seen to open up a 
space for disclosure.  It  indicates “the possibility  of a new, diferent,  'inhuman' way of 
experiencing and thinking about the world” (Malpas, 2003: 48). It  points towards new 
possibilities of though and action.
This point  is  signifcant  as –  like the  Burkean sublime – it  designates for the 
observer that something might happen; it invokes a feeling that something might take 
place  and announce  that  everything  is  not  over.  Of  course  though,  this  relief  is  not 
directly tied to fears of pain and death as was the case for Burke. Rather, for Lyotard, such 
a moment relieves us, instead, from the kind of privation that “is lurking in  the term 
banality –  the fear that all we have is more of the same, recycled, a staled and wearied 
world  attempting  to  delude  itself  with  a  constant  parade  of  trashy  “innovations”” 
(Edwards,  2002:  264).  Herein  thus  lies  the  pleasure  of  Lyotard's  sublime,  and  by 
extension,  the pleasure  of  experiencing the bow chime's  'strange'  timbre.  As Lyotard 
explains, confronted by such a seemingly unformed and unfamiliar thing, the “possibility 
of nothing happening … [leads] to a feeling of anxiety” (Lyotard, 1991: 141). However, as 
he  continues:  its  “suspense  can  also  be  accompanied  by  pleasure[;]  ...  pleasure  in 
welcoming the unknown, and … the joy obtained by the intensifcation of being that the 
event brings with it” (ibid).
Undoubtedly, it is signifcant then that this particular case study of the bow chime 
represents a frst encounter with the bow chime and its sound-timbre; a point, that is, 
when this particular timbre seemed unfamiliar to, and unassimilable within, one's stable 
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discursive orders. This represented a point, in other words, when this particular timbre 
seemed imminent, about-to-happen, on the fringe of coming into being in the world of 
the already present. As such, it represented a moment of potential disclosure: a relief 
from the endless proliferation of the same.
Summary.
To summarise, in this section I have suggested that sublimity could be aroused by 
a frst encounter with the sound-timbre of the bow chime, a point when that sound-
timbre seemed 'strange', unusual or surprising in a way that is unnerving and hard to 
understand. In this experience, it was noted how the mind 'scrambled for determinacy, to 
ascertain the sound's identity;  to categorise it,  order it  and classify it',  but it  seemed 
simply 'incapable of achieving such a task'. The timbre seemed to be, instead, 'something 
other', 'something unknown', 'something that evades phrases'. 
The stress upon the unknown and the unfamiliar presents striking relevance to a 
refned version of Kant's  sublime by Jean-François Lyotard; a formulation in which an 
object is seen to expose a basic incommensurability within our experience that neither 
reason  nor  understanding  is  capable  of  resolving.  In  Lyotard's  sublime  moment, 
something is  presented to the mind for which it  is  unprepared,  which unsettles  it.  It 
invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself, and is seen to reveal new possibilities of 
thought and action in a way that relieves us from the feeling of the endless proliferation 
of the same. In the case of the bow chime, timbre is the main focus of attention here, and 
accordingly, the bow chime generates a timbre that does not seem to belong to anything, 
to anything other than itself; a timbre that cannot be defned or categorised, that 'speaks' 
of nothing, that announces nothing. Seemingly, there is almost nothing to 'consume'. It is, 
an immaterial timbre. A sublime timbre. 
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Conclusion.
The concern of this thesis has been with sublimity. Specifcally, the sublimity of a 
certain sound, as heard in certain experiences, and produced by a certain playable sound-
sculpture,  the  bow  chime.  Sublimity  as  a  term  signifes  a  contradictory  sensation  of 
pleasure and pain, a disjunctive moment in which experience slips out of conventional 
understanding. It represents a profound moment; a moment when words fail and points 
of comparison disappear; a moment when the mind grasps a feeling for what lies beyond 
thought and language. A moment of anxiety and joy, of tranquility and horror, of terror 
and delight, of failure and redemption, it is of such a moment, as found in the experience 
of the bow chime and its sound, that I have attempted to theorise in this work. I have 
observed three scenarios, each diferent in nature, and each drawing upon diferent types 
of experience or diferent aspects of the sound in question. Each experience, though, I 
have linked in some way to the notion of the sublime.
Overall, in this thesis I have perhaps formed three proposals as to the nature of 
the bow chime's sublimity: 
• The frst concerns the terror of loud sound, and considers sublimity (via Burke) as 
a  mechanism  related  to  self-preservation.  My  proposal  here  rests  on  the 
association between extreme, loud forms of sound – such as those we might 
encounter listening to the bow chime – and the notion of noise. I am following 
here  a  characterisation  of  noise  by  jacques  Attali  (1985),  who  considers  the 
notion to represent sounds that disrupt and antagonise the resolve of order – in 
perhaps a similar way to a moment of chaos or anarchy. The experience of such 
sounds thus might be said to prompt, for the listener, a sense of danger, horror 
or terror.
           In the experience of the bow chime's sound though – which, likewise, is 
often extremely loud and 'noisy' – such a sensation of terror may give way to a 
feeling of delight. This feeling arises in the realisation that the particular sound – 
or more accurately, the particular noise – in question is couched in various codes 
and conventions and so is, in a way, ritualised. Realising that the terror of noise is 
ritualised thus provides a sense of reassurance; a sense of safety and security; a 
feeling that any actual danger is held back or suspended. As such – following 
Burke's sublime – the listener feels energised and invigorated having managed 
and survived a potentially threatening experience.
39
• The second proposal alternatively concerns the often prolonged length of the bow 
chime's  sound,  and  considers  sublimity  (via  Kant)  as  related  to  the 
incomprehension of boundaries and forms. My proposal in this case rests upon a 
characterisation of the bow chime's tone as extended to the point whereby the 
mind becomes lost. By this I mean to say that the sound is so prolonged that, 
when attempting to discern the duration of its length, the mind looses all grasp 
upon  its  perceptions,  and  the  sound  consequently  appears  unbounded  and 
formless  –  it  seems  to  extend  forever.  A  frustrating  moment  in  which  one's 
imagination fails to cohere and properly discern the excesses of experience, the 
listener  is  thus  forced  to  conceive  the  seemingly  'unbounded'  phenomenon 
through the higher ideas of reason – ideas such as the infnite, the unbounded, 
the formless and such. This disjunctive moment gives rise to a kind of cleavage 
within the subject between what can be presented (that is, imagined) and what 
can be conceived. However – following Kant's sublime – such a moment in turn 
serves as a kind of pleasurable awakening to the abilities of the mind to grasp the 
unimaginable.
• Lastly, the third and fnal proposal concerns a certain 'strangeness' of timbre, and 
considers sublimity (via Lyotard) as a disruptive moment in which critical thought 
is forced to the point of crisis. My proposal in this fnal case rests upon the timbre 
generated by the bow chime being seen as strange and unfamiliar; that is, as 
unusual  or  surprising  in  a  way  that  is  unsettling  or  hard to  understand.  The 
timbre,  in  other  words,  is  seen  as  something  that  consciousness  cannot 
formulate,  as  something  that  has  somehow  slipped  between  divisions  and 
categorisations, and that exists outside of our current systems of discourse as we 
know  them.  The  experience  of  such  a  moment  exposes  a  basic 
incommensurability in one's experience that neither reason nor understanding is 
capable of resolving. However – following Lyotard's sublime – such an experience 
procures a certain pleasure in welcoming the unknown and the new.
These proposals, then, indicate a number of ways that the notion of the sublime 
may relate to the bow chime: they outline the mechanisms that underlie various sublime 
encounters with its sound, and so form a number of proposals as to the nature of its 
sublimity. I should perhaps stress at this closing juncture though a point already made 
earlier: that these proposals are not intended to be strictly accurate or reliable in every 
encounter with this sound or each of its specifc characteristics, but are, rather, simply 
'rules of thumb'. These proposals, in other words, represent educated guesses as to the 
nature of the sound's sublimity as based upon a selection of my own experiences with it. 
They represent a broadly accurate guide as to the sound's sublimity; a guide that very well 
might account for others' 'sublime' experiences of it. 
Though these proposals may well not always be readily applicable and accurate, 
in this guide we do at least begin to see emerge a new sense of clarity and understanding 
of  this  sound  and  our  experience  of  it.  We  begin  to  defne  it;  to  categorise  it;  to 
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understand it. Each proposal sets forth its own defnitions, its own concerns, and its own 
signifcance – which no doubt can be explored further in the future. Yet overall, each also 
fnds  the  sound,  in  its  own  individual  way,  as  a  profound,  intense  experience;  an 
experience that destabilises us, that unsettles us, that haunts us. Indeed, if we have learnt 
anything from this work at all, then surely it must be this: that the experience of this 
sound is bound to the (sublime)  spectacle; that  experiencing this sound can tap into 
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